PAPER

The Complexity of the Future and the New Theories of Growth: Human Capital, Technology, Policy Choices and Global Governance

Giorgio Dominese

Abstract The paper is focused on the crucial issues of the New Theories of Growth but of course after a sharp premise on the quest for Global Governance stepping up and the opposite situation in which we are in these really months. The looming conflicts of the Second Cold War have special boundaries and are not conventional. ISIL is not really a traditional army and operates at global level much more than supposed. Isolated and individual countries responses are unrealistic and dangerous at the same time. The New Theories of Growth robustness and the opposite weakness of the traditional International Relations frames of interpretations and prescriptions are proposing the really "Prisoner's Dilemma" game theory results, where the convergence of aims and scope can't produce the indispensable sharing of risks and efforts by the two sides. But the interrelated conditionality and implications of Global Governance policies and procedures are forcing towards negotiated but not precarious or vulnerable results in world affairs. In the quite effective equation and outcomes, shown through the drivers and clusters of the Formel-G elaborated by the Research Division of the Deutsche Bank in 2005 but with reference to the rigorous range of theoretical propositions both from the distinguished scholars Romer-Mankiv-Weil from Berkeley University and the coincidentally two homonymous authors cholar Paul Romer from Stern School of New York University. They had already closed the circle that is now imposing a reshaping, change, innovation of ideas and attitudes also to the more sensitive policy choices centers. This is the basic conclusion from the many spin-off of this paper in some way challenging the traditional formalism of the too often aseptic and "zero-sum-game" contributions on the crucial issues for the economy, financial system, development and growth of all the humanity in the one world.

Keywords Global Governance, Conflicts and Terrorism, International Relations, New Theory of Growth, European Union, Environment, Corruption

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The impending change of the international order and the new players and factors determining policies and strategic choices, which once were an absolute monopoly of nation-states, empires and hegemonies, have now shown new profiles and tentative alternative processes still "work in progress" at the dawn of a planetary era as we are facing in these decades. It will be a very engaging age because it requires the acceptance of challenging and critically reviewing principles before given for eternal, adapting social, political, ethnic, identities but first and foremost new scientific and cultural assumptions and theories. No use to remain only spectators in a kind of comfortable process, with obsolete certitudes and simplified policies in mind when facing the complexity and the risks mounting in this very moment of the reshaping process.

The Looming Conflicts of the Second Cold War

The recent developments and the concrete looming of wide conflicts are showing the true "clash of civilizations", that is not only the proclaimed one by the US historian Samuel P. Huntington¹ few years ago - based mainly on the traditional contrasts and divide of faiths, ideologies and intellectual values, evoked as instrumental explanations easily communicated to the public and the "masses", through the simplified language of worldwide coverage and tragic spectacle that quite often this implies - but mainly the antagonism of two strategies and camps, due in part to deluded long caressed expectations and on the other side by cultural fundamentalism.

The first is attempting rationally to catalyze the new variables and factors of change in a sufficient least common multiple theoretical frame of values, policies and practices for an innovative global governance and interdependence among institutional, social, racial, religious, cultural often incompatible values. The second is fueling the fire on the still deeply unequal sharing of the benefits resulting from the already achieved value added outcomes of the last decades of global growing dimension of the international governance. With the results that a more integrated community of nations and states is not approaching but instead risking to be pushed far away. In this poisoned environment conflicts and terrorism might find further support and capabilities never before shown and practiced.

In other words, we have already in front of us a wide dimension of one economy, one finance, one technology, one science, one ICT, one fashion, one environment, one access to what never before had been so available, tempting, desirable for humanity: equal opportunities, gender equality, education for all, youth on stage, human rights, great mobility of people through borders, work and job opportunities worldwide. The list might be continued with tens of titles of value added reasons and benefits of the present and future scenario of the human community. But antagonism is prevailing instead of convergence, or better the main stream of the convergence is encountering

¹ The true "clash of civilizations" is not only the proclaimed one by the US historian Samuel P. Huntington few years ago but mainly the antagonism of two strategies and camps, due in part to deluded long caressed expectations and on the other side by cultural fundamentalism.

a fierce resistance and counter attacks by the past, traditional doctrines and institutional representations.

Even so, could we imagine a future without global governance? The general assumption is that we can't not at this stage of change and innovation negate its existence, as the main common ground assumptions have already widely spreading inside society life style with a decisive support and scientific support all the most relevant schools of thinking and quantitative researches centers worldwide. Pascal Lamy, Director General of WTO, in a lecture at Oxford University in 2012, had in this way pictured the "state of the art" and no way back options: "We live in a world of ever-growing interdependence and interconnectedness. Our interdependence has grown beyond anyone's imagination in fact! Economic and financial shocks spread faster than ever before. With the recent economic crisis we discovered that the collapse of one part of an economy can trigger a chain-reaction across the globe. With the climate crisis, that our planet is an indivisible whole. With the food crisis, that we are dependent on each other's production and policies to feed ourselves. And with the flu epidemic, that speedy international cooperation is vital. The scope of the challenges the world is facing has changed profoundly in the past decades — more profoundly, I suspect, than we fully understand. The world of today is virtually unrecognizable from the world in which we lived one generation ago"².

A long way must be undertaken to spread the benefits to the many who all still staying at the window with growing resentments, listening the sirens of destabilizing conflicts and of extremist fractions. Nothing is more destabilizing than the deluded expectations due to the missed opportunities. In this situation is not really simply alarmistic to evoke the specter of a second Cold War.

The Origins of Totalitarianism and Therapies

The reference to the waves of provocative new reactionary opposition attempts to changing, bettering life and standing of the world community we are assisting is in fact really amazing and suggest some more deep scientific investigation on the contradictions and wrong policies adopted in the last post-colonial and Third World long spring season hopes because incapable to jump over the previous models of governance, while attributing too much relevance to continuities and contiguities with nationalistic and sectarians heritages. We lost a window of opportunities and to rebuild now confidence and trust might become harder and harder, in presence of negative attributes of all many countries and great powers had been proved in reports, files and diplomatic documents from institutional archives circulating now free of restriction or even declassified, after the expiration of the legal terms for total secrecy. To research and read through them we might often remain astonished.

More or less officially admissions are now circulating on wrong evaluations, mistakes and policies in situations and events occurred in the five continents, with a systematic

² P. Lamy, (2012) Director General of WTO, in a lecture at Oxford University in 2012

lack of coherent reforming support to the newly entered post-colonial and independent players in the world of international affairs. The control of basic raw materials, oil and gas production, commodity supply chain and cheap labor encountered the strategic needs and conditionality of military relevance, in the age of bipolar confrontation and first Cold War lasting for almost a century.

At least until the end of Soviet Union and the "deicing" of the blocking confrontation, when the redemption of history had signed great pages of high profile and farsighted visions both in Russia and in the Euro-Atlantic policy, intellectual, academic more illuminated circles and decision making institutions. It was the process and melting pot of the Helsinki Final Act³ of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed in the Finnish capital on August 1, 1975 by 35 Euro-Atlantic and Eastern European countries involved.

A good lesson for the future, where the new incumbent but different kind of possible Cold War shouldn't suggested to the main powers the fatal omissions and mistakes of the past policies and failures, specifically in the really regions of the present conflicts and terroristic unpredictable forms of war deeply menacing the international order and bringing higher the risks of continental war.

From the organized barbarian ISIL terrorism in a and open challenge to the main emblematic symbols or signs of civilization to isolated crimes and mass murdering by single persons and deadly serial killers, inspired by hate against community places like schools, universities, social centers, place for gathering and enjoy music, sports, cultural events or for personal retaliation. From brutality of violence against "differences" in race, religions, ethnical provenance, gender to nostalgic movements of nationalistic inspiration or pan-totalitarian trivial and demagogic aims, easily poured and absorbed by threatened public opinions. Finally, the exaltation and nostalgic "apologia" of political systems and social organizations as aberrant as fascism, sovietism, nationalism, clericalism, racism, nihilism, totalitarianism, militarism which unique faith at the end is the progressive abolishment of fundamental individual and groups freedom, with evocation of ethnic cleansings and forced assimilation of peoples and minorities.

The pursuit of forms of government, economies and institutions following ancestral dirigistic and authoritarian model already failed many times in past history with catastrophic economic, social and political impact for the entire humanity, all these syndromes are before our eyes. Hannah Arendt's⁴ fundamental main 1951 work "The Origins of Totalitarianism", "Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft", analyzed in a unique striking intellectual contribution all these phenomena and the tragedies they had induced in Europe but with an effective universal applicability. It's a kind of situation as we are facing now, after the Ukrainian war directly supported by Russia; the Crimea "Anschluss" with analogies with the Austrian past memories; the four years of Syrian civil war waged by the despotic regime in Damascus - now hopefully

³ Helsinki Final Act http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. The views, opinions, conclusions and other information expressed in this document are not given nor necessarily endorsed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) unless the OSCE is explicitly defined as the Author of this document.

⁴ Hannah Arendt's fundamental main 1951 work "The Origins of Totalitarianism", Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951; "Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft", Schocken Books, 1951

entered toward an end after the UN resolution just in the threshold of 2016 - a war that transformed into a devastating fire burning hundreds of thousand lives, pushing refuges to escape toward the "European dream", with implications and burdens of extraordinary relevance but with a long term credit that will sign the victory over the tyrants in the Middle East and North Africa.

International Relations Theories at Stake

Utopias had been the drug of people when no ways to resolve their basic problems in home countries occurred or because a wrongly interpreted value of not "interference" allowed the international community, first of all the United Nations - created to the purposes of peace and prosperity for all at the end of World War II but step by step transformed into a "zero sum game" Glass Palace in New York, simply for the use of the five Yalta great powers formal endorsement of agreements often reached out of any international law and human rights consideration -, while staying aside and leave many regional conflicts to be transformed into blood bathes and atrocities. The Balkan War 20 years ago, after the ethnic cleaning and criminal killing of thousands Bosnians by the Serbian troops and special units had been a unique case of international responsibility and of judicial follow ups, with the politician generals and top responsible of the horrible crimes against humanity belonging to all the factions severely judged sentences by The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia⁵ sand condemned to multiples life sentences for crimes against humanity.

There will be no other way out than entering the arena with a shared project in mind, supported by a wide coalition of genuine, transparent will and of course a military capability and credibility if we want in the future to avoid feeding an irreversible, already mentioned syndrome of "World War III" and caressing rebuilding up tragic memory sphere of influences, a perspective caressed by some regimes irresponsible analysts and experts as a possible "exit strategy". These old style "realistic" illusions represent the worst scenario that would fatally induce dramatic consequences. The world we are discussing in this paper is antagonist to these ideas, forces and military actions leading them. Soon or later, the "Redde rationem" of Latin memories will fatally reestablish the civilization and human rights broken by genocide, aggressions and atrocities.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

The sophisticated analytical tools, models, theories and the infinite capacity of quantitative processing in almost real time provided by the data processing and informatics revolutionary tools must be mobilized and new deterrence of ideas and mightiness quickly deployed to crush any possible challenger. It's unthinkable to become again prisoners of these phantoms. We cannot be victims of the "prisoners dilemma" in its various assumptions and applications.

⁵ United Nations The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1996-2015, The Hague, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/judgement-list

A multipolar, multifaceted approach and solution to the "dilemma". The full understanding of this definition could bring to a fair alternative that could be better appreciated by applying the analyses and options of the global governance recalled in this paper.

The prisoner's dilemma is a canonical example analyzed in game theory that shows why two purely "rational" individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at Rand in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation's investigations on the game theory, which Rand pursued because of possible applications to nuclear strategy options during the first Cold War (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)⁶. The two players in the game can choose between two moves, either "cooperate" or "defect". The idea is that each player gains when both cooperate, but if only one of them cooperates, the other one, who defects, will gain more. If both defect, both lose (or gain very little) but not as much as the "cheated" co-operator, whose cooperation is not returned. Such a distribution of losses and gains seems natural for many situations, since the co-operator whose action is not returned will lose resources to the defector, without either of them being able to collect the alternative additional gain coming from the "synergy" of their cooperation. For simplicity we might consider the Prisoner's dilemma as zero-sum insofar as there is no mutual cooperation

It is quite a demanding age, requiring change and effective solutions without any easy bridging way out if not at growing risk for the entire humanity. We have to accept discussing and openly confronting, following the principle of arguing and critically reviewing the asymmetric social, political, ethical values, but first of all praising the strong scientific and cultural beliefs and traditions of the whole international community we symbolize with our civilization, a "renaissance" kind of universalistic philosophy and ideals.

This does not mean we have to renounce national values, peculiarities of "identity and diversity", sovereignty boundaries that summarize the universal intellectual and spiritual heritage, the ethical and moral values of a varieties of philosophic doctrines and religious faiths. That's why International Relations shortcut refuge into a row "realism", even if inspired by Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War"⁷ great contribution, as it represents a negative, fatalistic, opposite intellectual and political choice than the never lasting search for more advanced and sophisticated doctrines. The same might be said of "Machiavellian", an approach very often associated with political deceit, deviousness and realpolitik. But main commentators⁸, such as Baruch Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Denis Diderot, have argued that Machiavelli

⁶ Prisoner's Dilemma, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sep 4, 1997. The prisoner's dilemma is a canonical example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two purely "rational" individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950.

⁷ Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War", MIT University Press, Boston

⁸ B. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico politicua, V, 7; D. Diderot, Machivellianism, in Encyclopedie; J.-J. Rousseau, Contratto sociale, III, 6

was actually a Republican, even when writing The Prince, and his writings were an

inspiration to Enlightenment proponents of modern democratic political philosophy and in fact of crucial International Relations theories.

As in Economics, in the broad Social Sciences, Technology, Human Capital and Environment, just to mention, the new factors and deep scenario horizons impose to move ahead in the theoretic frame of an interdependent, constructive and multiplayers world, assuming the new theories of IRs and coherent guidelines as indispensable to the governance of the still new Century XXI with its incredible promises for people and leaderships of "good will", as could be appreciated in the textbook by Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen⁹ "Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches" offered now in the 6th Edition by Oxford University Press.

European Union Turning Point

The European Union is the most remarkable turning point impressed with the constituent Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the progressive integration and devolution to the Union of sovereign powers. From that historical date we have assisted to the upgrade of innovative approach to specific international connected policies with the EURO Monetary Union, that up today has 19 member states. If we assume that almost all EURO countries are at the same time also NATO 28 members with the newly invited member Montenegro (apart from Austria for the reason of the State Treaty after the Second World War) and that Switzerland, not being neither in EU nor in EURO zone and in NATO, on the base of the Constitutional neutrality of the Confederation, has in any case specific relevant harmonization agreements and common regulatory procedures in main fields of EU governance, we can assume as historic and worldwide main example of successful regional integration and interdependence. Non-statehood approach had been implemented and fine-tuned in the almost 60 years from the EU constitution in quite challenging passages and growing international implications.

But also Europe is in the phase of reviewing and implement the constitutional structure of the Union, not simply because of last waves of refugees arrival from Near and Middle East on fire but as the achieved integration must be an adaptable system of rules and sharing of powers for an enlarged "common house" as EU had become. Grexit tensions and fears have found in 2015 a positive conclusion, after exhausting negotiations, while the UK referendum on the EU membership is posing new challenges to the Brussels governance. Updated and more new institutional set of powers and procedures would be in any case introduced as much as the international standards, competitiveness, regulatory and new growth conditions will suggest and request. The auspices of the "United States of Europe" seem in any case still far from the subsidiarity principle and the peculiar, flexible concept of federalist approach introduced with the Treaty of Rome and representing a possible common ground of convergence among all the EU member countries, UK included.

⁹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen "Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches", 6th Edition 2015 (Oxford University Press

These attitudes and mindset should be presented and diffused among the individual citizens but beforehand and immediately it requires leaderships, elites, knowledge, competences, investments, reforms, resources and permanent innovation based on cultural and technological quickly advancing step-ups, on environmental and energetic priorities which are permanently evolving and sweeping away yesterday's experience of mankind and society.

Never before this historic period of passage had shown the indispensable need for an architecture of international governance based on the preconditions and the forthcoming needs of assimilation, the new values, credible pillars deeply involving institutions, public, private, productive, education, entrepreneurial and social levels.

To imagine the diffusion of the international governance model that European Union had been capable to build up represents is in some ways far from a realistic perspective. But similar but peculiar regional transnational organizations - tailored on specificities, peculiarities, cultural and different history of other potential main regional approaches to governance in Asia, Latin America and Africa - have already now a large background of research and applied experiences. As I said, the "European dream" remains the best visiting card to penetrate the world spirit and the openness of economies, universities, high research institutions, technologies exchanges, arts and culture.

This is a convergent interpretation of the complexity of the future proposed more than twenty years earlier by the controversial but farsighted French philosopher Edgar Morin¹⁰ in his famous essays "How to govern the future complexities" and in the essay "Seven Complex Lessons in Education for the Future".

The New Theories of Growth and Global Governance

A relevant contribution to the understanding of the irreversible changes factors up from 1980 had been brought by the debate and massive scientific efforts that had accompanied the New Theories of Growth appearance and now running fast towards not yet foreseen analytic and applied results and further interpretation tools for the interdependence and convergence of Economics, Law, Innovation, Environment, Alternative Energy, Aerospace, Social Sciences into a consistent theoretical background for the effective international Governance. Human capital factor is in need of this high profile convergence to remain always adequate to future challenges and advancements.

Where IRs could not proceed due to the before mentioned reasons, these new platforms of theories around the basic principles of Growth and Governance have achieved great applied results and scientific robustness. We will see in the next sections the key factors and the implications for the international governance. Economists have often marginalized or even criticized, until the last decades, the role played by "institutions" in the productive system, while they have always better dedicated to the operative aspects of economy, finance and corporate system at work, in one word following a business approach. Also Keynesian and neo-classic schools have

¹⁰ E. Morin, a French philosopher and sociologist who has been internationally recognized for his work on complexity and "complex thought". "How to govern the future complexities" and "Seven Complex Lessons in Education for the Future".

focused these key variables but never entering deeply into the effects of the ongoing change in the whole system of governance left out of the reshaping in the future transitional time. The scenario and change from here up to 2030-2050 is simply amazing and positively unpredictable: environment, energy, innovative discoveries in almost all the traditional and advance sectors, agro-industrial advancements, welfare, health, supercomputing unbelievable a and institutional implications. In fact, the institutions determine nowadays the way and conditionality into which "systems" much be governed effectively and in fine-tuned way in an ever advancing summing up of variables covering all aspects of governance, at national and transnational levels.

"The invisible hand" is a metaphor used by Adam Smith¹¹ to describe unintended social benefits resulting from individual actions, first of all and mainly with respect to income distribution. Now that "the hand" on the one side has become more visible, transparent and with high degree of efficiency even when interfering with the classic theories but on the other has shifted into a more impenetrable and invisible challenge and daily confrontation to protect the sensitive "core" of the. That's why - to use a popular assumption not far from true - hackers are at work tirelessly to penetrate the restricted area of governance at all levels, even the apparently less important. It's a big game with a high stakes, where no main player can stay at the window, so everyone listens, monitor and interfere. We might say quoting the biblical sentence: "who is without sin cast the first stone"

The "policy choices", even if inside different architectures and organizations of the factors frames, are connecting in an interdependent way each country to others, a net of societies and markets looking for a desired permanent trend of growth and welfare. The same interdependence is involving the research and expertise sectors and professionals. The same binding conclusions can be easily be drawn even if the lack of a systemic and scientific integrated approach to face the challenges of global governance in a conditions of partial asymmetry. We are talking of course in general assumptions, as there are many exceptions and peculiarities.

The Turning Point Season 1980-2010

We can say that 1980 and the years immediately following brought a breakthrough for the change in attitudes, knowledge and progress regarding all these issues. But in the previous century, some brilliant scientists in the main disciplines spanning a broad horizon stood out in writing, teaching, researching, publishing and predicting the need of a "common ground" for the advancements in governing the changing economy, society and institutions of all the levels existing now. A kind of transnational movement in the name of the better governance of the planet.

What had happen in around 1980 to 2010 to make these years such turning point for the re-discussion and the new assumptions on world governance? The big push start really here and proceeded quickly up to the beginning of the new Century XXI. A constellation of many but very significant outcomes of researches and institutional focusing on the

^{11 &}quot;The invisible hand" is a metaphor used by Adam Smith to describe unintended social benefits resulting from individual actions, first of all and mainly with respect to income distribution.

new stage of growth and development denominated "global", in principle, and affecting all the leaderships as well as professionals, entrepreneurs, lawmakers and intellectuals. As in the theoretic applications of the cobweb model, even the International Relations were becoming more and more affected by the new waves of theories. We assisted to a flourishing of tentative but robust policy advice outcomes circulating and pushing ahead new knowledge advancements.

These remarks are a bit far off - I am aware - from the traditional approach to systemic analyses. But at the end, we have fuel a wider debate on peculiar and in many ways different starting conditions. No forms of conditionality or corporative barrier or intellectual is anymore granted to segments or islands with boundaries and "off-limits" scientific territories. The race for a better scientific approach to the future "horizons" of knowledge and intensive research dedication and value added. The same geopolitics was facing the parallel "vexata questio" on the limits of power but of course no limits are any more sustainable if not being widely shared and negotiated with all the players on specific issues that are under questioning and debating in a growing number of critical cases.

From international to global. Around the 1990s the world experienced the passage from a traditional approach endogeneity and growth to the new theories cultivated in the best thin-tank worldwide. Universally accepted new theories domain and applied quantitative and sophisticated measurements of variables - still never well investigated and even when not yet well grounded on a scientific shared way but just posed into a strong trend line of credibility and consensus - start to be animated by economists and research centers. However, incredible but true, the real avant-gardes of thinkers and analysts were coming, before 1980, from the International Relations studies and researches, attempting to provide a conceptual framework of robust theoretical perspective to the emerging but quickly inflated global quagmire. IRs theories were compared to pairs of different colored sunglasses that allow the wearer to see only salient events relevant to the theory; e.g. an adherent follower of "realism" might completely disregard an event that a constructivist were deeming as crucial, and vice versa.

The three most analyzed theories realism, liberalism and constructivism went quickly at odds between the consistent conservative attitude and a reforming dynamic and very determined minority of scholars, experts and researchers. The third theoretical frame was the new "intriguing" entry, as it's mainly connected with the experience and upgrading of the role and power of the European Union, at this crucial passage of the new Century almost enlarged to the today's dimension, with 28 member countries. The theories of constructivism had propagated and asserted themselves rather strongly in the policy choices of the EU's regulatory ruling, in the ECB Eurozone strategy, in the economic and financial guidelines within the most advanced form of regional governance existing worldwide and assuming a growing power and "soft" but effective capability

to give voice and enforce political will up to today. Even the danger of a Grexit has been managed in 2015 following innovative and non-orthodox monetary, financial and policy choices, leaving the world quite wondering and questioning. A good ground for future debate and advanced research. Which amazing events happened then in the years

around 1990? Well, to mention just some of the most astonishing geopolitics events we remain astonished: the Internet changing completely the economic and human relations in the world; the German reunification opening the season in 1989-1990; the end of Soviet Union in 1991; the rising of China to a distinctive great power, with almost two digits growth yoy, in a still socialist frame but in a progressively open market system and society; the war in the Former Yugoslavia bringing new hopes in the Balkans; the shocking, unpredictable terroristic attack on 9/11 to the Twin Towers and US symbols, just an announcement of the contemporary ISIL terroristic massive attacks in Paris, Bamako, Lake Chad, Ankara, Nigeria, Beirut, Sinai Russian airplane bomb, California. The contagion had been spreading out by the four years a civil war in Syria, in fact a regime butchery tolling almost three hundred thousand lives and at least four millions refugees outside the country; by the open wounds of the still debated and argued Iraq war and repercussions; by the not yet resolved Israeli military occupation of West Bank and the spreading the lacerating problems; by the even wider implications of the spreading conflicts and terrorism from the Great Middle East to Europe, Africa, USA and Asia.

Economics and real economy could add a better rationality, the real substance, the very bright thinking behind these events: the technological revolution; the "health of nations", prolonging life beyond any expectations; the environmental issue passing from a deficit spending to a factor of production; the human capital incorporated into innovation becoming the crucial factor of production; the new concept of security and defense; wider inequalities destabilizing the so called developed world and its central social stability, with two quintiles of middle classes inhabitants happily in power. All these issues give now enough reason to a "re-visitation" of the chaos theories, as the world collapse in fact did not come and will not come looking to the developments taking place in this end of 2015-beginning 2016 scenario.

The Transition Towards 2030-2050

We are simply in a major transitional period of worldwide growth and governance towards 2030-2050. Good point to restart with our present and future. Two cornerstones in the academic and intellectual debate had certainly been the in depth research analyses with "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth" by Romer-Mankiv-Weil¹², the trio from Berkeley University, published in preview by the prestigious NBER on December 1990, a real turning point in the Economic Sciences theoretical architecture on production, growth, institutions, technology and policy choices. The second was the silent, initially almost unknown scientific activity with a sophisticated value added of the contributions by Ronal H. Coase¹³, who was Nobel Prize of Economic Sciences

¹² N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, David N. Wei , "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth", NBER Working Paper No. 3541, 1990

¹³ Professor Ronald H. Coase was Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. For his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Ronald Coase received the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1991.

in 1991, with his memorable lecture in Stockholm on "The Institutional Structure of Production".

I copy and paste first the presentation of these assumptions on the Empirics of Economic Growth with no further comments, as we can all agree for a global standing scientific acclamation.

NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH N. Gregory Mankiw David Romer David N. Weil Working Paper No. 3541

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 1990 We are grateful to Karen Dynan for research assistance, to Laurence Ball, Olivier

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether the Solow growth model is consistent with the international variation in the standard of living. It shows that an augmented Solow model that includes accumulation of human as well as physical capital provides an excellent description of the cross—country data. The model explains about 80 percent of the international variation in income per capita, and the estimated influences of physical—capital accumulation, human—capital accumulation, and population growth confirm the model's predictions. The paper also examines the implications of the Solow model for convergence in standards of living—that is, for whether poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. The evidence indicates that, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge at about the rate the augmented

Solow model predicts. David Romer, Gregory Mankiw Department of Economics NBER 787 Evans Hall 1050 Massachusetts Avenue University of California Cambridge, MA 02138—5398 Berkeley, CA 94720 David Weil NBER 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138—5398

But Ronald Coase ¹⁴ too had been really a lighthouse and maritime compass in the early spring of the economic research at that time. He was announcing the great, impressive change, in his Nobel Lecture on "The Institutional Structure of Production" and in a following interview from where I take some more lines of reference.

"In my long life I have known some great economists but I have never counted myself among their number nor walked in their company. I have made no innovations in high theory. My contribution to economics has been to urge the inclusion in our analysis of features of the economic system so obvious that, like the postman in G.K. Chesterton's Father Brown tale, The Invisible Man, they have tended to be overlooked. Nonetheless, once included in the analysis, they will, as I believe, bring about a complete change in the structure of economic theory, at least in what is called price theory or microeconomics. What I have done is to show the importance for the working of the economic system of what may be termed the institutional structure of production. In this lecture I shall explain why, in my view, these features of the economic system were ignored and why their recognition will lead to a change in the way we analyse the working of the economic system and in the way we think about economic policy, changes which are already beginning to occur. I will also speak about the empirical work that needs to be done if this transformation in our approach is to increase our understanding. In speaking about this transformation, I do not wish to suggest that it is the result of my work alone. Olivier Williamson, Harold Demsetz, Steven Cheung, among others, have made outstanding contributions to the subject and without their work and that of many others, I doubt whether the significance of my writings would have been recognized". And now the incipit of Professor Coase's¹⁵ interview. "What I'm going to talk about today is why economics will change. I talk about it because I don't only think it will change, I think it ought to change. And also I'd like to say something about the part which the University of Missouri will play in bringing it about. It will take a long time. It won't be an easy task, but I'm glad there are people here who are willing to undertake it. What I'm saying today is not in an ordinary sense a lecture, it is just a talk, perhaps one would say a battle cry. It is just intended to give my views

¹⁴ These citations are from Professor Ronald H. Coase's Nobel Prize Lecture in Stockholm and following comments.

^{15 &}quot;The Institutional Structure of Production" interview

on this subject, why I think that economics will change. It is a striking – and for that matter depressing – feature of economics that it has such a static character. It is still the subject that Adam Smith created. It has the same shape, the same set of problems".

"Now of course we've made improvements, we've corrected some errors, we've tightened the argument, but one could still give a course based on Adam Smith. He was perhaps the greatest economist who has ever been, but the difference between what has happened in economics and what we find in the natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, or biology is really quite extraordinary. Isaac Newton was a great man. He made a great contribution, but you wouldn't really base a lecture today in physics on Isaac Newton, or in chemistry on Lavoisier, or in biology on Charles Darwin. Charles Darwin was a great man, but we no longer accept his views on inheritance and therefore on how evolution works. Changes in physics, chemistry, and biology continue to this day. It so happens that before taking a degree in commerce, for a short period I started to take a degree in chemistry. What was taught then as chemistry was completely different from what is taught today. Francis Crick has called the old chemistry just a series of recipes. And my recollection of what I was taught suggests that was accurate".

Deutsche Bank Research Formel-G¹⁶

From the theories to the applications the distance was really short. Few years later, Deutsche Bank Research elaborated the Formel-G, a chapter of a frame program on Megatrend 2020 prepared in Frankfurt. Summarizing all the giant elaborations and testing done by the DBR Division, I focus now on the Report three crucial passages.

Theory and methodology

After the first results have been presented and the analytical framework has been outlined, the next two sections explain the fundamentals of modern theoretical and empirical growth analysis. An important element of Formel-G will be derived: the econometric equation.

Searching for technological progress

Growth forecasts must have a solid theoretical foundation. The basis of most growth analyses is the neoclassical production function in which output Y is a function of labour input L, capital input K and the level of technology A (Solow residual; usually called "total factor productivity"). Growth decompositions divide actual growth into these three components. However, over the long-term, the sole driver of any growth of per capita output is the progress of technology A. It also is crucial for the long-term increase in the capital stock per capita¹⁷. Therefore, forecasts of economic growth with the help of simple growth decompositions require more or less arbitrary assumptions

¹⁶ Deutsche Bank Research Formel-G

¹⁷ This is set out very clearly by Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 457 and 460.Hanna

on technological progress¹⁸. They do not explain the really interesting variable A but bury it in an assumption. Therefore, simple growth decompositions are not suitable for forecasting.

Theoretical foundation: the production function ¹⁹

Production function in the Solow model

 $Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} \cdot (A_t \cdot L_t)^{1-\alpha}$

The often assumed absolute convergence of income levels between countries (i.e. poor countries' GDP grows faster than rich countries') also lacks theoretical and empirical support. There is no automatism: higher income levels do not fall from heaven like manna but require hard work²⁰. GDP of a country only converges to the country-specific income level that is determined by that country's growth drivers.

Therefore, any useful model of the future has to explain technological progress. This is easier said than done, however. Mankiw/Romer/Weil made a path breaking contribution in 1992 by incorporating human capital H as a measure for the quality of labour input into the empirical growth analysis. Human capital describes a person's ability to produce output efficiently and to develop new products. This important additional variable helped significantly in explaining historic income differences across countries. The often assumed absolute convergence of income levels between countries (i.e. poor countries' GDP grows faster than rich countries') also lacks theoretical and empirical support. There is no automatism: higher income levels do not fall from heaven like manna but require hard work . GDP of a country only converges to the countryspecific income level that is determined by that country's growth drivers. Therefore, any useful model of the future has to explain technological progress. This is easier said than done, however. Mankiw/Romer/Weil made a path breaking contribution in 1992 by incorporating human capital H as a measure for the quality of labour input into the empirical growth analysis. Human capital describes a person's ability to produce output efficiently and to develop new products. This important additional variable helped significantly in explaining historic income differences across countries.

Production function in the Mankiw/Romer/Weil model:

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} \cdot H_t^{\beta} \cdot (\tilde{A}_t \cdot L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$

For empirical growth analysis, this was a great step forward but not fully satisfactory yet. Both theoretical and empirical work of the last ten years tried to model the remaining, unexplained share of technological change after human capital is taken into consideration. The objective is to explain economic growth as fully as possible in the model by incorporating a further policy variable P (or several variables). Exogenous, unexplainable influences are to be minimised.

¹⁸ For example, filter techniques with averages of the past are applied or absolute convergence with other countries is assumed.

¹⁹ Theoretical foundation: the production function

²⁰ Easterly and Levine (2001) even observe a divergence in income levels.

Production function in Formel-G

$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} \cdot H_t^{\beta} \cdot (P_t \cdot \tilde{A}_t \cdot L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$

The search for P gave rise to a flourishing literature dealing with the role of politics, institutions, knowledge and innovation²¹. In their overview, Durlauf, Johnson and Temple²² (2004) identify 42 "growth theories" using a total of 102 variables – which may be combined in different variations²³.

Although theory does not produce a clear conclusion on the "correct" growth model (the "correct" P) it helps us identify potential growth drivers. The decision as to which additional variables really have a statistically and economically significant link with growth will have to be based on econometric analysis.

As I have now presented in this very visual impact "facts", the entire system of reporting and analyzing the world main factors and variables had simply jumped from the past to the future, without passing for any intermediate rest, even at the price of some scientific weakness open to the further in depth debate in all the research community. In Annex I, you will find an advanced globalization Index prepared annually by KOF Index of Globalization by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ), is one of top reference ranking, measurement and weighting of the before mentioned variable P. The KOF Index of Globalization offer the full countries ranking on the following three main indicator: Political Globalization, Social Globalization, Economic Globalization and a overall Globalization index. For more definition and methodologic details visit the http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/²⁴

Last but not Least

A special attention must be dedicated to Environment, Welfare (Annex 2), Human Capital, Higher Education and University, in one word to the institutional choices main crucial priorities, the Public Policy at global level. Just consider the relevance of the Environment and Climate in absorbing governmental expenditures worldwide. And see how much our countries public budgets are investing for the Welfare in a broad accession. Laws, regulations, juridical and judicial, policies and fight against corruption²⁵ (Annex 3 and 4) are the becoming top priorities for all the countries. Sound economy and political systems are incompatible with corruption. Corruption, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development around the world. It distorts markets, stifles economic growth, debases democracy and undermines the rule of law (Annex 5).

²¹ The World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and the NBER have contributed many new insights with new data sets and a large number of publications.

²² Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004)

²³ Temple (1999) also gives an excellent overview.

²⁴ KOF Index of Globalization by the Swiss Federal Institute, 2015: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/

²⁵ T. Persson, G. Tabellini and F.Trebbi, Electoral Rules and Corruption, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 1, Issue 4, pages 958–989, June 2003; Annex 3 and Corruption Perception Index 2014 and Clean Business is Good Business, Annex 4, 2008.




Figure 1 DBR - Deutsche Bank Research's trend map

Spreading around the world, representing 5-7 % of the global GDP and let's see also the ranking as they are meaningful. Corruption, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development around the world. It distorts markets, stifles economic growth, debases democracy and undermines the rule of law. Electoral systems are quite often connected to the relevance of this phenomena in the public investments and procurements, where I add in Annex the data showing almost 25% of these expenditures are absorbed by direct or indirect "corruption" of public and private sectors. More than these data, I have added the OECD SOCIAL EXPENDITURE UPDATE 2014²⁶, (Annex 2), with an overview on the crucial welfare and social standing of the worldwide regions and countries

Conclusions

Arriving at the conclusions of this paper, I have to introduce a specular model by Paul Romer²⁷, as the Romer deeply tied to New Growth Theories are in fact two: David Romer, one of the great scholars trio at Berkley University and previously at Princeton University, to whom I have assigned a tribute and recognition for his outstanding innovative contribution to a breakthrough in the previous theories of endogenous growth, without dismissing them; Paul Michael Romer, coincidentally two homonymous authors as David, an eclectic researcher and entrepreneurial spirit, professor of economics at the Stern School of Business at New York University and previously senior fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Development.

What distinguish the two thinkers and their vision of the New Theories of Growth is in fact the degree of emphasis and the implications of a major role of policy choices and governments in what was before supposed to be mainly an endogenous results from the upcoming relevant factors of production, namely human capital and technology. Even if I had perceived perceive the trio Romer-Mankiv-Weil²⁸ as the really one introducing a new general approach to the theoretical assumptions and applied implications, I must say that the visons emerging from his model of the New Theory of Growth - where the diffidence for a too large and thaumaturgic roles attributed to governments, institutions and policy choices accompanies in background the rigorous theoretical flows of the "Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth" - is very attractive and intriguing at the same time.

Let's see his crucial point on "Endogenous Technological Change", written in 1989 when he was still at the University of Chicago: "Growth - says Paul Romer in this model - is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, <u>partially excludable good</u>. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, 26 OECD SOCIAL EXPENDITURE UPDATE, Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, Paris, 2014, Annex 2

27 N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, David N. Wei , "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth", NBER Working Paper No. 3541, 1990

28 Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, Part 2, 1990 price-taking competition cannot be supported. Instead, the equilibrium is one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth".

Old and New will continue to compete in the long run but the Theory of Growth has already achieved the status of the robust theoretical guideline for a reasonable global governance.

Annex 1

2015 KOF Index of Globalization Annex 1

	country	Globalization Index	_	country	Economic Globalization	_	country	Social Globalization	_	country	Political Globalization
1. Irela	and	91.30	1.	Singapore	95.69	1.	Austria	91.54	1.	Italy	97.52
	herlands	91.24	2.	Ireland	92.59	2.	Singapore	90.83	2.	France	97.51
	gium	91.00	3.	Luxembourg	91.12	3.	Switzerland	90.80	3.	Austria	96.76
4. Aus		90.24	4.	Netherlands	90.33	4.	Netherlands	90.53	4.	Belgium	96.51
	gapore	87.49	5.	Malta	90.31	5.	Ireland	90.50	5.	Spain	96.17
	eden	86.59	6.	Belgium	87.99	6.	Belgium	90.05	6.	United Kingdom	95.93
	ımark	86.30	7.	United Arab Emirates	87.77	7.	Cyprus	88.41	7.	Sweden	94.86
Port	tugal	86.29	8.	Estonia	87.39	8.	Canada	88.36	8.	Brazil	94.23
9. Swi	itzerland	86.04	9.	Hungary	86.35	9.	Denmark	86.79	9.	Netherlands	93.52
10. Finl	land	85.64	10.	Finland	84.77	10.	France	86.50	10.	Egypt, Arab Rep.	93.46
11. Hun	ngary	85.49	11.	Bahrain	84.71	11.	United Kingdom	85.84	11.	Switzerland	93.40
12. Can	nada	85.03	12.	Czech Republic	84.59	12.	Portugal	84.77	12.	Portugal	93.39
13. Cze	ch Republic	84.10	13.	Mauritius	84.50	13.	Sweden	84.10	13.	Canada	93.39
14. Spai	in	83.71	14.	Austria	84.16	14.	Norway	84.10	14.	Turkey	92.97
15. Lux	tembourg	83.56	15.	Sweden	83.21	15.	Germany	83.75	15.	Argentina	92.83
16. Cyp	orus	83.54	16.	Slovak Republic	83.20	16.	Slovak Republic	82.63	16.	United States	92.41
	vak Republic	83.52	17.	Portugal	82.73	17.	Finland	82.46	17.	Germany	92.17
18. Nor		83.30	18.	Denmark	81.77	18.	Spain	82.36	18.	Norway	91.99
	ted Kingdom	82.96	19.	Georgia	81.04	19.	Australia	82.11	19.	Denmark	91.84
20. Fran		82.65	20.	New Zealand	80.92	20.	Czech Republic	81.90	20.	India	91.74
	stralia	81.64	21.	Cyprus	80.90	21.	United Arab Emirates	80.77	21.	Finland	91.42
22. Italy		79.51	22.	Panama	80.36	22.	Kuwait	80.72	22.	Hungary	91.40
23. Pola		79.43	23.	Latvia	80.31	23.	Hungary	80.59	23.	Greece	91.29
24. Este		79.35	24.	Malaysia	80.30	24.	Greece	79.84	24.	Australia	91.03
25. Gree		79.08	25.	Qatar	80.10	25.	Liechtenstein	79.57	25.	Nigeria	90.95
	laysia	79.08	25.	Trinidad and Tobago	79.18	26.	Luxembourg	79.39	26.	Ireland	90.93
	many	78.86	20.	Chile	77.94	20.	Poland	77.98	20.	Korea, Rep.	90.37
		78.29	27. 28.	Oman	77.45	27.	United States	77.98			90.37
	w Zealand								28.	Japan	
	ted Arab Emirates	76.71	29.	Lithuania	77.28	29.	Italy	77.79	29.	Romania	90.09
	venia	76.34	30.	Mongolia	76.86	30.	Monaco	77.12	30.	Morocco	90.08
	garia	76.11	31.	Norway	76.17	31.	Israel	75.95	31.	Chile	89.48
32. Cro		75.69	32.	Spain	76.08	32.	Andorra	75.79	32.	Pakistan	89.38
33. Mal		75.48	33.	Montenegro	76.00	33.	Malta	75.37	33.	Poland	89.30
	ted States	74.81	34.	Iceland	75.82	34.	Malaysia	74.65	34.	Senegal	88.43
	nuania	72.71	35.	Switzerland	75.72	35.	Estonia	74.36	35.	Indonesia	87.57
36. Isra		72.41	36.	Canada	75.48	36.	Saudi Arabia	74.18	36.	South Africa	87.53
	nania	72.27	37.	Bulgaria	74.88	37.	New Zealand	73.59	37.	Jordan	86.63
38. Qata		72.25	38.	Slovenia	74.45	38.	San Marino	73.43	38.	Czech Republic	86.59
39. Chil		71.08	39.	Australia	74.33	39.	Puerto Rico	73.06	39.	Peru	86.56
40. Latv	via	71.06	40.	Israel	73.89	40.	Slovenia	72.81	40.	Ukraine	86.01
	uland	71.02	41.	Poland	73.79	41.	Latvia	71.54	41.	Croatia	85.99
42. Ukr	raine	69.50	42.	Peru	73.10	42.	Croatia	71.06	42.	Philippines	85.34
43. Bah	nrain	69.34	43.	Croatia	73.07	43.	Bulgaria	71.00	43.	China	85.32
44. Turl	key	69.02	44.	Namibia	72.77	44.	Aruba	70.40	44.	Slovak Republic	85.22
45. Kuv	wait	68.40	45.	Brunei Darussalam	72.06	45.	Guam	70.39	45.	Bulgaria	85.17
46. Jord	lan	68.08	46.	Thailand	71.55	46.	New Caledonia	70.24	46.	Tunisia	85.16
47. Icela	and	67.96	47.	Swaziland	71.20	47.	Iceland	69.60	47.	Ghana	84.94
48. Mor	ntenegro	67.27	48.	United Kingdom	70.53	48.	Bahamas, The	68.91	48.	Russian Federation	84.91
49. Pan		66.84	49.	Barbados	70.26	49.	Bahrain	68.85	49.	Uruguav	84.33
	snia and Herzegovina		50.	Kazakhstan	69.69	50.	Romania	68.06	50.	Guatemala	84.29
	rocco	65,97	51.	Greece	69,43	51.	Macao, China	67.86	51.	Slovenia	84.06
	uritius	65.90	52.	Congo, Rep.	69.35	52.	Lithuania	67.17	52.	Malavsia	83.70
	ssian Federation	65.90	53.	Papua New Guinea	68,78	53.	Dominican Republic	66.69	53.	Ethiopia	83.62
54. Japa		65.87	54.	Italy	68.25	54.	Japan	66.58	54.	Kenya	83.48
	iguay	65.68	55.	France	67.85	55.	Lebanon	66.14	55.	Algeria	82.04
56. Sert		65.49	56.	Ukraine	67.52	56.	Brunei Darussalam	65.76	56.	Thailand	81.99
	mei Darussalam	65.38	57.	Macedonia, FYR	67.16	57.	Turkey	65.23	57.	New Zealand	81.45
			57.		66.88	57.	Serbia	65.05	57.		81.45
	idi Arabia	65.27	58. 59.	Jamaica					58. 59.	Ecuador	
59. Peru		65.09		Jordan	66.01	59.	Russian Federation	64.80		Colombia	80.38
60. Leb	anon	64.85	60.	Lebanon	65.72	60.	Virgin Islands (U.S.)	64.23	60.	Cyprus	80.16

	country	Globalization Index		country	Economic Globalization	_	country	Social Globalization		country	Political Globalization
61.	South Africa	64.82	61.	Guyana	65.05	61.	Costa Rica	63.40	61.	El Salvador	79.65
62.	Korea, Rep.	64.65	62.	South Africa	65.04	62.	Qatar	63.25	62.	Luxembourg	79.16
63.	Georgia	63.84	63.	Germany	64.10	63.	Thailand	62.93	63.	Paraguay	78.35
64.	Trinidad and Tobago	63.56	64.	Armenia	64.09	64.	Mauritius	62.77	64.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	77.73
65. 66.	Moldova Costa Rica	62.45 62.16	65. 66.	Honduras	63.99 63.88	65. 66.	Bosnia and Herzegovina Belarus	62.67 61.58	65. 66.	Sri Lanka Bolivia	77.47 76.72
66. 67.	Oman	62.16	66. 67.	Uruguay Romania	63.88	66. 67.	Belarus Macedonia, FYR	61.58	66. 67.	Bonvia Bangladesh	76.72
68.	Dominican Republic	61.50	68.	Vanuatu	63.72	68.	Antigua and Barbuda	60.67	68.	Burkina Faso	76.36
69.	El Salvador	61.00	69.	Cambodia	63.62	69.	Ukraine	59.95	69.	Mali	76.15
70.	Guatemala	60.99	70.	Costa Rica	62.67	70.	Bermuda	59.44	70.	Estonia	75.46
71.	Mexico	60.77	71.	Vietnam	62.64	71.	Moldova	59.15	71.	Qatar	74.44
72.	Belarus	60.70	72.	Mexico	62.14	72.	Montenegro	58.85	72.	Lithuania	74.40
73.	Jamaica	60.64	73.	Azerbaijan	62.10	73.	Faeroe Islands	58.42	73.	Benin	74.36
74. 75.	Macedonia, FYR	60.34	74.	Albania	61.81	74.	Panama	57.87	74.	Cote d'Ivoire	74.24 74.07
75. 76.	China Kazakhstan	60.15 60.06	75. 76.	Lesotho Bosnia and Herzegovina	61.52 61.49	75. 76.	Jordan Oman	57.22 57.02	75. 76.	Niger Zambia	74.06
77.	Brazil	59.74	77.	Zambia	61.21	77.	Georgia	56.90	77.	Togo	74.00
78.	Paraguay	59.29	78.	Kuwait	60.78	78.	Morocco	56.50	78.	Guinea	73.27
79.	Namibia	59.23	79.	Serbia	60.73	79.	Samoa	55.52	79.	Jamaica	72.97
80.	Colombia	59.17	80.	Moldova	60.62	80.	Trinidad and Tobago	55.25	80.	Serbia	72.67
81.	Honduras	58.68	81.	Nicaragua	60.26	81.	Seychelles	55.23	81.	Cameroon	72.37
82.	Tunisia	58.64	82.	Nigeria	60.07	82.	Barbados	54.99	82.	Honduras	72.30
83.	Armenia	57.76	83.	El Salvador	59.83	83.	Grenada Grenada	54.71	83.	Mexico	72.24
84. 85.	Mongolia	57.57 57.48	84. 85	Indonesia	59.65	84. 85	Cayman Islands	54.53	84. 85	Mongolia	72.17
85. 86.	Argentina Indonesia	57.48 57.39	85. 86.	Angola Korea, Rep.	59.37 59.30	85. 86.	Uruguay Fiji	54.48 53.73	85. 86.	Singapore Nepal	71.37 71.19
80. 87.	Azerbaijan	57.19	80. 87.	Mauritania	59.30	80. 87.	Finite French Polynesia	53.75	80. 87.	Uganda	70.96
88.	Philippines	57.13	88.	Guatemala	59.03	88.	West Bank and Gaza	53.46	88.	Rwanda	70.70
89.	Fiji	57.06	89.	Timor-Leste	58.96	89.	Palau	52.75	89.	Fiji	70.45
90.	Barbados	56.88	90.	United States	58.77	90.	China	52.61	90.	Zimbabwe	70.36
91.	Egypt, Arab Rep.	56.33	91.	Morocco	58.41	91.	St. Lucia	52.36	91.	Kazakhstan	70.10
92.	Ecuador	54.68	92.	Dominican Republic	58.28	92.	Argentina	52.07	92.	Moldova	69.75
93.	Ghana	54.32	93.	Saudi Arabia	57.99	93.	Korea, Rep.	51.95	93.	Iran, Islamic Rep.	68.51
94.	Bahamas, The	54.27	94.	Yemen, Rep.	57.88	94.	Chile	51.80	94.	Armenia	68.03
95. 96.	Grenada Nicaragua	54.16 54.09	95. 96.	Paraguay Karana Paradalia	57.69 57.43	95. 96.	Mexico Azerbaijan	51.52 50.61	95. 96.	Montenegro Madagascar	67.43 67.04
90. 97.	Nigeria	54.05	90.	Kyrgyz Republic Colombia	57.10	90. 97.	Venezuela, RB	49.92	90. 97.	Kyrgyz Republic	66.91
98.	Senegal	54.00	98.	Bolivia	57.03	98.	Suriname	49.90	98.	Yemen, Rep.	66.80
99.	Kyrgyz Republic	53.91	99.	Botswana	56.99	99.	El Salvador	49.22	99.	Belarus	66.67
100.	Bolivia	53.76	100.	Tunisia	56.66	100.	South Africa	48.89	100.		66.65
101.	Gambia, The	52.96	101.	Sierra Leone	56.40	101.	St. Kitts and Nevis	47.97	101.	Venezuela, RB	66.56
	Albania	52.95	102.		56.33		St. Vincent and the Grena			Djibouti	66.37
	Samoa	52.90	103.		56.05		Paraguay	47.62	103.		66.10
	Swaziland	52.29	104.		55.94	104.	Guatemala	46.73		Malawi	65.41
	Venezuela, RB Sri Lanka	51.83 51.56		Turkey Belarus	55.63 55.43		Belize Ecuador	46.69 46.48		Israel Mauritania	65.25 65.22
	Pakistan	50.99		Gambia, The	55.24		Colombia	46.46		Namibia	64.83
	Zambia	50.86		Philippines	54.57		Jamaica	46.14	108.		64.66
109.	India	50.77		Suriname	54.53	109.	Nicaragua	45.43	109.	Cuba	64.04
110.	Antigua and Barbuda	50.30	110.	Russian Federation	53.27	110.	Maldives	45.20		Congo, Dem. Rep.	63.57
	Guyana	50.11		Cote d'Ivoire	51.61		Armenia	44.61		Tajikistan	63.13
	Djibouti	50.00		Uganda	51.40		Greenland	44.56		Saudi Arabia	62.44
	Cote d'Ivoire Zimbabwe	49.69		Senegal Brazil	51.04 50.96		Swaziland Brazil	44.41		Chad	61.97 61.79
	Belize	49.61 49.54	114.		50.85		Dominica	44.24 44.20		Papua New Guinea Lebanon	61.79
	Togo	49.47		Cape Verde	50.49		Honduras	44.19		Cambodia	61.67
	Algeria	49.36		Togo	50.32		Kazakhstan	43.92		Panama	61.17
	Papua New Guinea	49.18		Zimbabwe	50.07		Sri Lanka	42.97		Kuwait	61.09
119.	Cambodia	49.17	119.	Mozambique	49.94	119.	Gambia, The	42.69	119.	Central African Republic	61.04
	Vietnam	49.13		China	49.80		Peru	42.60		Burundi	61.00
	Gabon	49.01		Myanmar	49.74		Egypt, Arab Rep.	42.58		Liberia	60.94
	Seychelles Suriname	48.66		Mali	49.67		Albania	42.56		Tanzania	60.05
	Suriname Yemen, Rep.	48.49 47.82		Haiti Congo, Dem. Rep.	49.31 49.07		Namibia Tunisia	42.42 42.17		Azerbaijan Costa Rica	59.92 59.65
	Palau	47.82		Tajikistan	49.07		Kyrgyz Republic	42.17 41.56		Dominican Republic	59.65
	Lesotho	47.41		Japan	47.57		Cape Verde	41.24		Nicaragua	58.10
	Mauritania	47.10		Syrian Arab Republic	45.98		Uzbekistan	40.46		Latvia	57.60
128.	St. Lucia	46.75		Malawi	45.50	128.	Gabon	40.41	128.	Iraq	55.93
	Botswana	46.13		Ecuador	44.09		Philippines	40.04		Vietnam	55.78
130.	Kenya	46.04	130.	Egypt, Arab Rep.	43.83	130.	Syrian Arab Republic	40.00	130.	Albania	55.75
	Mozambique	45.91		Rwanda	43.72		Botswana	39.47		Brunei Darussalam	55.62
	Mali Uganda	45.85 45.81		Guinea Bahamas Tha	43.54 43.39		Guyana Diihauti	38.94 38.67		United Arab Emirates Lesotho	55.60
	Uganda Sierra Leone	45.81 45.75		Bahamas, The Venezuela, RB	43.39 43.15		Djibouti Turkmenistan	38.67 37.69		Lesotho Sudan	55.28 55.20
	Syrian Arab Republic	45.34		India	43.15		Libya	37.69		Malta	55.17
	Cuba	45.15		Sri Lanka	41.78		Pakistan	36.91		Iceland	54.78
	Tajikistan	45.02		Madagascar	41.35		Tonga	35.71		Trinidad and Tobago	54.03
138.	Congo, Rep.	45.00		Cameroon	40.83	138.	Algeria	35.21	138.	Grenada	53.36
139.	Cape Verde	43.76		Algeria	40.49		Zimbabwe	34.82		Libya	52.59
	Guinea	43.75		Kenya	39.16		Bolivia	34.76		Syrian Arab Republic	52.20
	Rwanda	43.68		Tanzania	39.10		Indonesia	34.36		Gabon	51.88
	Burkina Faso	43.55		Pakistan	37.91		Vanuatu	33.52		Georgia	50.15
	Vanuatu Aruba	43.52 43.47		Argentina Burkina Faso	37.52 37.23		Bhutan Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	33.51 33.43		Macedonia, FYR	50.09 49.28
	Malawi	43.47		Chad	36.58		Iran, Islamic Rep.	33.43		Afghanistan Samoa	49.28
		70,70	1.421					J			

		Globalization			Economic			Social			Political
	country	Index		country	Globalization		country	Globalization		country	Globalization
147.	Cameroon	43.30	147.	Bangladesh	35.28	147.	Sao Tome and Principe	32.49	147.	Haiti	48.23
148.	New Caledonia	42.59	148.	Benin	34.66	148.	Togo	32.10	148.	Bahamas, The	48.10
149.	Uzbekistan	42.34	149.	Central African Republic	33.90	149.	Cuba	32.08	149.	Angola	47.56
150.	Macao, China	42.08	150.	Guinea-Bissau	32.60	150.	Vietnam	31.64	150.	Oman	46.30
151.	Angola	42.05	151.	Iran, Islamic Rep.	30.18	151.	Ghana	31.48	151.	Timor-Leste	46.24
152.	Bangladesh	41.92	152.	Sudan	28.05	152.	Cote d'Ivoire	30.87	152.	Guyana	45.64
	Niger	41.61		Nepal	26.77		India	29.98		Guinea-Bissau	45.63
	Iran, Islamic Rep.	41.38		Ethiopia	25.99		Kiribati	29.41		Uzbekistan	45.05
	Dominica	41.15		Burundi	21.79		Iraq	29.34		Mauritius	44.79
	Benin	40.90		Afghanistan			Tajikistan	29.19		Belize	44.30
	Madagascar	40.76		American Samoa			Mongolia	29.05		Congo, Rep.	41.92
	Haiti	40.70		Andorra			Lesotho	28.49		Barbados	41.14
	St. Vincent and the Grena			Antigua and Barbuda			Comoros	28.40		Botswana	40.79
	Timor-Leste	40.42		Aruba			Mozambique	28.11		Palau	40.14
	Congo, Dem. Rep.	40.35		Bermuda			Haiti	27.27		Seychelles	39.16
	Iraq	40.22		Bhutan			Nepal	27.17		St. Lucia	38.64
	St. Kitts and Nevis	39.55		Cayman Islands			Burkina Faso	26.87		Turkmenistan	38.36
	Liberia	39.55		Channel Islands			Cambodia	26.74		Suriname	38.14
	Nepal	38.54		Comoros Cuba			Kenya	26.70 26.29		Cape Verde	38.11
	Maldives Turkmenistan	38.07 37.96		Djibouti			Malawi Guinea-Bissau	26.29		Swaziland Dominica	37.61 36.73
	Chad	37.62		Dominica			Cameroon	25.54		Antigua and Barbuda	35.31
	Ethiopia	37.43		Equatorial Guinea		168.		25.09		San Marino	35.31
	Tanzania	37.43		Eritrea			Zambia	24.93		Myanmar	35.10
	Bermuda	36.77		Faeroe Islands			Rwanda	24.93		Comoros	35.14
	Faeroe Islands	35.83		French Polynesia			Liberia	24.74		Lao PDR	33.97
	Central African Republic			Greenland			Niger	24.43		Sao Tome and Principe	33.39
	West Bank and Gaza	34.46		Grenada			Eritrea	24.33		Andorra	33.35
	Cayman Islands	33.53		Guam			Bangladesh	24.21		Equatorial Guinea	32.98
	Guinea-Bissau	33.41		Iraq			Solomon Islands	24.21		Monaco	32.90
	Myanmar	33.01		Isle of Man			Congo, Rep.	23.89		Eritrea	31.17
	Sao Tome and Principe	32.86		Kiribati			Equatorial Guinea	23.69		St. Vincent and the Gren	
179.	French Polynesia	32.82	179.	Korea, Dem. Rep.		179.	Benin	23.69	179.	Vanuatu	30.12
	Burundi	32.26	180.	Lao PDR		180.	Guinea	23.53	180.	Somalia	28.95
181.	Tonga	31.89	181.	Liberia		181.	Uganda	23.06	181.	Liechtenstein	28.94
182.	Sudan	31.54	182.	Libya		182.	Mauritania	23.00	182.	Maldives	27.75
183.	Comoros	31.15	183.	Liechtenstein		183.	Somalia	22.93	183.	St. Kitts and Nevis	27.40
184.	Afghanistan	30.62	184.	Macao, China		184.	Nigeria	22.77	184.	Korea, Dem. Rep.	26.94
185.	Bhutan	29.30	185.	Maldives		185.	Burundi	22.37	185.	Solomon Islands	26.77
	Equatorial Guinea	27.49		Marshall Islands			Madagascar	22.03		Tonga	26.37
	Eritrea	27.13	187.			187.		22.02		Bhutan	23.20
	Lao PDR	26.91		Monaco			Chad	21.76		American Samoa	22.77
	Kiribati	26.00		Netherlands Antilles			Papua New Guinea	21.75		Kiribati	21.06
	Somalia	25.39		New Caledonia			Angola	21.72		Marshall Islands	18.98
	Solomon Islands	25.26		Northern Mariana Islands	3		Mali	21.24		Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	17.97
	American Samoa			Palau			Sierra Leone	21.12		West Bank and Gaza	6.99
	Andorra	•		Puerto Rico			Tanzania	19.51		Netherlands Antilles	5.90
	Channel Islands	•		Samoa			Timor-Leste	18.68		Macao, China	4.81
	Greenland	•		San Marino			Sudan	18.51		Aruba	4.54
	Guam	•		Sao Tome and Principe			Central African Republic			Bermuda	3.99
	Isle of Man	•		Seychelles			Afghanistan	17.71		Cayman Islands	3.18
	Korea, Dem. Rep.		198.				Ethiopia	16.38		Faeroe Islands	3.18
	Liechtenstein			Somalia			Congo, Dem. Rep.	15.98		Puerto Rico	3.18
	Marshall Islands			St. Kitts and Nevis			Myanmar	15.56		French Polynesia	2.63
	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.			St. Lucia			American Samoa	•		Greenland Guam	2.63
	Monaco Notherlando Antillos			St. Vincent and the Grena	aumes		Channel Islands				2.63
	Netherlands Antilles Northern Mariana Islands			Tonga Turkmenistan			Isle of Man Korea, Dem. Rep.			New Caledonia Virgin Islands (U.S.)	2.63 2.09
	Puerto Rico	• •		Uzbekistan			Marshall Islands			Northern Mariana Island	
	San Marino			Virgin Islands (U.S.)			Netherlands Antilles			Isle of Man	1.54
	Virgin Islands (U.S.)			West Bank and Gaza			Northern Mariana Island			Channel Islands	1.27
207.	viigin Islands (0.5.)		207.	ii coi Dank anu Odža		207.	rioratern Mariana Island	<u> </u>	207.	chantier Islanus	1.00


*Note: Rankings are based on raw data for the year 2012.

Source:

Dreher, Axel, 2006, Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a new Index, Applied Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110.

Updated in: Dreher, Axel; Noel Gaston and Pim Martens, 2008, Measuring Globalization - Gauging its Consequence, New York: Springer.

Annex 2



Pensions and health are the largest areas of social spending

Countries on average spent more on cash benefits (12.3% of GDP) than on social and health services (8.6% of GDP). but Nordic countries, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom had a more equal balance in spending on cash and in-kind benefits. Low-spending countries like Mexico and Korea have a greater focus on services in social support (Figure 3).

(regule 3). Cash income support to the working age population accounts for 4.4% GDP on average across the OECD (Figure 3), of which 1% GDP towards unemployment benefits, 1.8% on disability/sickness benefits, 1.3% on family cash benefits and another 0.4% on other social policy cash supports.


Public expenditure on health is another important social policy area (Figure 3). On average across the OECD, public expenditure on health has increased from 4% in 1980 to 6% of GOP. This increase was related to various factors including rising relative health prices and the cost of medical technology (OECD, 2014, Health

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
Statistics 2014), and to a lesser extent the increase in the proportion of the elderly population.

the proportion of the eldery population. In terms of specifical public periodin payments constitute the largest social policy area with spending algue tablew 840 c600. There is great writery across councile in pension spending which its source actert is accounted for 15.8% of GDP while this was only 1.8% of DP in Mexico, and Mexico is a relative source counter is accounted for 15.8% of GDP while this was only 1.8% of DP in Mexico, and Mexico is a relative source counter of Glaroch, at the same time, failable and Japanese populations have a similar age profile, but polici parsion spending to high 3.5 generative points of systems also plays a key role in determining pension spending. spending.

Since 1980 public spending on pensions has increased by 2 percentage points of GDP on average across the OECD, and demographic change continues to exert upward pressure on pension expenditure. *Pensions at a Glance* (OECD, 2013) and *Pensions Outlook*



SOCX also includes indicators on net (after tax) social expenditure for 33 countries for 2011 (information on taxation of benefit not become available until two years after the facal year). Time series for the majority of countries are available size 2010. Re detail involves interct taxation of benefit income, indirect itaxation of consumition out-of-benefit income, and tax howset.



Note: Countries are narked by decreasing order of public social expenditure as a percent of GDP. Spending on active labour market programs (ALMPs) cannot be split by cashrenices breakdown, they are however included in the total public spending (shown in bracket), income sport to the working-appropriation freets isolary sporting on the following SOC categories: incomposit beneficial, smort cash brenefic, unemployment and other social policy areas categories. Data for Australia. Chine, tareet, Korea, New Zestand and the United States relate to 2012, other data meter 2011.

(DECD, 2012) show that in many countries pension reforms have improved the financial sustainability of indexation proceedings of the pension of the pension indexation proceedings for benefit payments, agreater relaxes on private and/or defined contribution defines, or higher reformant agas: For asymptotic Superannuation⁴ from 60 to 65 over the 1992-2001 spenda onthibute to a define in public pension spending in New Zaaland from 63% to 46% of GDP over the 1992-2001 pendid.

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Social cash benefits can be made for different reasons to different households, including because people are retired, disabled, unemployed, or otherwise without source of income, or to help out with the cost of children or support households when they are on leave taking care of very young children or sick and/or elderly dependents. Benefit receipt can thus depend on different contingencies, it does not necessarily mean the receiving household spoor.




Figure 5 shows the share of cash social benefits paid to the lowest quintile and the hiphest income quintiles in GCC countrie. Cereich, there is considerable variation across OEC countrie. Cereich, there is considerable variation across OEC countries in the extent to which social time share of cash therefits paid to bouched in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the bottom income exceeds 25% of al cash benefits in the formal sector, and effers concern persion payments bound exceeds usual taranteers of the top income quintile in sustairs, rance and Luxembourg.

Income-testing in cash benefits

detting a relatively high level of spending on cash benefits to lower-income households can be related to high levels of overall expenditure on cash benefits and/or a high degree of trapping within social social support can be made directly consignent on household income and/or means (e.g. assets), and as a tool to ensure delivery of social support to the last weblich in the cor of budgeary pressures.

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and Japan, around 5% of GDP in Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, and highest in Switzerland at around 6% of GDP.

Private social benefits are much less likely to concern Private social benefits are much less likely to concern capit transfers to the working ase population. In terms of spending, sichess and disability-related benefits were most important in Austria, France, Gemany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland where they anounted to 134 GOF and were around 254 GOP in koland. Private social spending also includes social spenices and benefits provided by non-government organisations (NGO) to those most in need, but such spening is under-reported in SOCK.

sending is under-reported in SOCX. Michikulu out-of-yokki spending on heith service is not regarded as social spending, but many printe heith insurance planes across the CBC Drucke pooling of contributions and risk sharing across the insured population. On versign across the PGC Drucke pool of contributions and risk sharing across the insured social health expenditure amounted to 0.6% of DP in Chile, but across OECD contries private health public spending on health amounting to 8% of GDP in tak-reass on health premiuming to 8% of GDP in tak-breaks on health premiuming to 8% of GDP in tak-breaks on health premium (just over 2.5% of GDP) in tak social social health premium (just over 2.5% of GDP) in tak social social health premium (just over 2.5% of GDP) in higher than in frame which is the second biggest higher than in France which is the second biggest "health spender" among OECD countries.

Theath spender' among UEUD countries. In all, in 2011/12 priviter social spending was on average 2.5% of GDP across the OECD. Private social spending plays the most important role in the United States where it amounted to almost 11% of GDP, while it ranged from 4 to 7.5% of GDP in Chile and Canada, 5 to 5 % in Demank, Iceland and the United Kingdom and over 7% in the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The impact of tax systems Tax systems can affect social spending in three different ways:

- Governments can levy direct income tax and social Governments can levy direct income tax and social security contributions on cash transfers to beneficiaries. In 2011 the Danish Government clawed back more than 5% of public social spending through direct taxation of benefit income, and tax levied over benefit payments also exceeds 2.5% of GDP in Austria, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands and Swadon Sweden.
- Sweden. 2. Government: also, levy: indirect taxation on consumption out-of-benefit income and on average across the GCD this was worth 24 xCd GDP in 2011. Tax rates on consumption are often considerably lower in non-typean GCE countries where tax revenue on consumption out-of-benefit income often amounts to less than 14 xCd GDP. In Europe, relevant tax revenue ranges from 1.8 to 3% of GDP.

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For the first time this year, SOCX coll-comprehensive information on whether expenditure programmes were income and/or means-tested or not, with "income-tested benefits" defined as those benefits that aimed to prevent household income to be believed and the top prevent household income to fall below a certain level and for which eligibility and entitlements are conditional on the recipient's current income, and assets in the case of means-testing.

mecome, and assets in the case of means-testing. Figure 6, Parel A forses that income-testing is most prevalent in non-European and/or Angleohome contries, and plays a much more limited role in example, in Australia, social ignoring through income-tested programmes amounts to 6.5% of DOP animots BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of all public social cash spending that is made. BMS of DP except in Span, where spending income-tested unemployment benefits in now 2.5 times as high as it was before the crist.

In most countries, income-tested benefits mainly concern income support of the working-age population (Figure 6, Panel B). However, in Australia, Iceland, Canada, Grece, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway and Spain at least 40% of income-tested payments go to old-age and survivor pension recicients.

3. Governments can also use so-called "tax breaks

with a social purpose" (TBSP) to directly provide social support or with the aim to stimulate the private provision of social support.

 TBSPs which directly provide support to households are similar to cash benefits and househous are similar to cash benefits and often concern support for families with children, e.g. child tax allowances or child tax credits. Such TBSPs amounted to around 1% of GDP in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Portugal and Hungary - which introduced a Child Tax Credit in 2011.

Introduced a Unild Tax Credit in 2011. b) TBSPs to stimulate provision of "current" private social benefits is largest in the United States at around 1.4% of GDP, of which almost 80% concerns exclusion of employer contributions of medical insurance contributions.

contributions. Accounting for these features, results in a "net tax effect "Figure 7). The value of benefit income dawed adult frough direct and inderct taxatoine exceeds the tayone, and the class and inderct taxatoine exceeds the tayone, and the class-back is 5% of GDP in Tore in Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and is highest at 34% of GDP in Demmark, in non-European OEDC countries, the overall ta claw-back over social spending in much smaller and negligible in Korea and Mexico, and in the United States the value of TBSP and the tax claw-back over benefit income is broadly similar.

Cross-country transings Putting together the information on gross public and private social spending and the impact of tax systems leads to an indicator on net total social sependiture (Tiger 7). This indicator shows greater similarity in spending levels across countries and changes in the ranking among countries.

Because of the large "net tax effect" Austria, Luxembourg and Scandinavian countries drop down the rankings [Figure 7]. The "net tax effect" is also considerable in Iceland, the United Kingdom and the

Netherlands, but the large role of private social benefits

ensures that in spending terms these countries move up the rankings when considering net total social

The combination of small "net tax effects"

The combination of small "net tax effects" and considerable private social spending ensures that Australia, Canada, Japan and in particular the United States: move up the international acadia spending ladder. As private social spending (including health) is so much larger in the United States compared with other countries, its inclusion moves the United States of mor 32⁴⁷ in the ranking of the gross public social spending to 2⁴⁷ splace when comparing net total social society acanteries.


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expenditure.

spending across countries.

5





Note The following cash income-tested spending items are included, spending on "other contingencies, -other social policy area the QECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX), income-tested spending on the unenployed (e.g. unenployment testations payment Germany), income-tested support payments to olderly and disable(e.g. Belgium and the UK), other income tested payments (spayments, family, cash transfers) but do not include spending on ALMPPs, housing or income-tested metapromets (supports). Private social expenditure


In the United States public social spending is relatively low, but total social spending is the second highest in the world

the world Thus far, the discussion focussed on public social spending on cash benefits and social and health services, and in the United States and other non-European OECD countries such spending is lower than in most European countries. However, a focuson public budgets misses two important features that affect social spending totals and international comparisons of social expenditure: 1) private social expenditure and 2) the impact of tax systems.

Photos social expenditure Photos social expenditure concerns social benefits delivered through the private sector (not transfer between individual) which involve an element of compution and/or inter-personal redistribution, for social expenditure. In which and longevity. Pervisos constitute an important part of both public and private derive from mandstory and valutary employed based derive from mandstory and valutary employed based derive from mandstory and valutary employed based (e.g., individual) in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, or tax-supported individual persion plans (e.g., individual) in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, or tax-supported individual persion plans (e.g., individual) (environment) in the payments were around 3% of GDP in Canada, Iceland,

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From gross public to total net social spending, as a percent of GDP at market prices, 2011



Note: The Spurse hardwise refers to the narring of countries in term of group public social expendium from numb the lowest 33 is a the Number States ranks and or RECO In term of group public social expendium and 2nd in the lowest 30 is the Number States ranks and social expendition of the social social and the States of Policy and the social expension of the social expension of the social expenditure and 2nd in the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions) and private social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in succession) and social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in succession). The social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in succession) and social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The value of the social benefits (e.g. donations to charties or exemptions of private heads in successions). The social of the social benefits (e.g. donations) and social benefits (e.g. donations) be 2011 data or TSSN for Nex Zakator were estimated usary analytication for motion for 2000, indicators or direct transmission of benefit motion of benefit and the set of the seto

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More information: Adema, W., P. Fron and M. Ladaique [2011]. 'Is the European Welfare State Really More Expensive?' Indicators on Social Spending. 2012 and Admanual to the OCC Social Expenditure Database (SOC?). OCC Social, Employment and Magnetion Working Papers, No OCC Publishing: <u>Hirty Mode and J. 1037 (Nava Machael Social Social Protection and How Redistributive</u> Adema, W., P. Fron and M. Ladaique (2014), 'New Mukub Do CCD Countries Spend on Social Protection and How Redistributive Are the TaxJewerking System", *International Social Social Years*, Vol. 67, J2012, pp. 125, re Expensive?: Indicators on Social Spending, 1980 nployment and Migration Working Papers, No. 124,

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OECD Family Database (<u>www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm</u>). OECD Income Distribution database (<u>http://oe.cd/idd</u>).

Source: Plases source this document as: OECD [2014], "Social Expenditure Update-Social spending is falling in some countries, but in many others it remains at historically high herek". This document as well as all figures and underlying data can be downloaded via <u>www.oecd.org/local/expenditure.htm</u>. En françai: <u>www.oecd.org/local/expenditure.htm</u>. En françai: <u>www.oecd.org/local/expenditure.htm</u>. COX: A valiable via COECD satisfical beneve COECD 30:1.1 for facilitate international comparison, this information ir elated to gross domestic product, gross national income, total government expenditure, and in purchasing power parties per head.

8

Annex 3

Electoral Rules and Corruption

Torsten Persson. Guido Tabellini. Francesco Trebbi¹

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies.

Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as nonparametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we and that larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.

[..]These are all models of electoral competition predicting that the extraction of rents is increasing in political instability, as more instability makes the perceived probability of winning less sensitive to rent extraction. Persson and Tabellini (1999) also contrast equilib rium behavior by politicians in two stylized electoral systems: one with PR in a single nation-wide district, another with plurality rule in a number of single- member districts. Electoral competition becomes stiffer in the latter system, as the candidates are induced to focus their attention on winning a majority, not in the population at large, but in marginal districts. containing a large number of swing voters.

As these voters are more willing to switch their votes in response to policy, candidates become more disciplined and extract less equilibrium rents. This prediction is less precise than those above, in that the argument does not distinguish well between district magnitude and the electoral formula. Countries with majoritarian electoral systems typically combine single-member districts and plurality rule, however.

At the opposite extreme, some proportional systems indeed have large districts and voters choose among party lists (Israel e.g. have just one nation-wide district where all representatives are elected and very low thresholds). But in between these polar cases you find intermediate systems, involving different district magnitudes, different size thresholds, and multi-tier systems mixing plurality rule and PR2. This institutional variation is fortunate in that it allows us to test separately the different hypotheses outlined above.

¹ NBER Working Paper 8154. www.nber.org/papers/w8154

These can be summarized as follows:

H1: Ceteris paribus, countries with larger district magnitude and lower thresholds for representation should have less corruption (the barriers-to-entry effect).

H2: Ceteris paribus, countries with a larger share of representatives elected as individuals rather than as members of lists should have less corruption (the career-concern effect).

H3: Ceteris paribus, plurality rule in single-member districts should be associated with less corruption than PR in large districts; moreover, corruption should be larger,


the larger is political instability (the electoral-competition effect).

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Annex 4

Annex 5

Clean Business Is Good Business



Facts and Figures*

Corruption, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development around the world. It distorts markets, stiffes economic growth, debases democracy and undermines the rule of law.

- Estimates show that the cost of corruption equals more than 5% of global GDP (US \$2.6 trillion), with over US \$1 trillion paid in bribes each year.
- Corruption adds up to 10% to the total cost of doing business globally, and up to 25% to the cost of procurement contracts in developing countries.
- Moving business from a country with a low level of corruption to a country with medium or high levels of corruption is found to be equivalent to a 20% tax on foreign business.

International Law

The international legal framework that companies are facing is changing fast and has been strengthened during recent years. It now includes the following intergovernmental instruments:

- Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996)
- OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1997)
- European Union Instruments on Corruption
- Council of Europe Conventions on Corruption (1997-1999)
- The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003)
- United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003)

Governmental instruments are also increasingly being adopted at the national level; sometimes with global implications to companies, i.e. the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US.

Why Should Your Company Engage?

Companies are subject to extortion and some play a role in paying bribes. Accordingly, the private sector is also part of the problem and can also be part of the solution (for example, by sharing responsibility for finding ways to effectively fight corruption).

What Can Your Company Do?


An increasing number of companies are demonstrating leadership by implementing effective anti-corruption programmes within their companies. Common features of such programmes include:

- Detailed policies on company-specific bribery issues such as kickbacks, extortion, protection money, facilitation payments, conflicts of interest, gifts and hospitality, fraud and money laundering, and political and charitable contributions
- Management systems and procedures outlining frameworks for risk assessment, training, sanctions, whistle-blowing, continuous internal self-review and external reporting

Companies are increasingly engaging in sector-specific or multi-industry initiatives, locally, regionally and/or globally, to share their experiences, learn from peers and, in partnership with other stakeholders, contribute to levelling the playing field.

There are a number of principles, recommendations and guidance and implementation tools available to companies. They have been developed in cooperation with companies and tested in real corporate environments. See the back of the leaflet for further information.

*Source: World Bank



Note: The map is based on Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index. The score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The Industries ranking is drawn from Transparency International's 2002 Bribe Payers Index. The scores, similarly from 0 to 10, reflect the propensity of companies in different sectors to pay bribes.

	Benefits of Engaging	Risks of Not Engaging
Individual Company Action	 Reduce the cost of doing business Attract investments from ethically oriented investors Attract and retain highly principled employees, improving employee morale Obtain a competitive advantage of becoming the preferred choice of ethically concerned customers/consumers Qualify for reduced legal sanctions in jurisdictions like the US and Italy 	 Criminal prosecution, in some jurisdictions both at company and senior management levels which can lead to imprisonment Exclusion from bidding processes, e.g. for international finance institutions and export credit agencies "Casino risk" – no legal remedies if a counterpart does not deliver as agreed and/or keeps increasing the price for doing so Damage to reputation, brand and share price Tougher fight for talent when hiring new employees Regulatory censure Cost of corrective action and possible fines
Collective Action by Business	 Create a level playing field overcoming the "prisoner's dilemma" Improve public trust in business Influence future laws and regulations 	 Missed business opportunities in distorted markets Increased magnitude of corruption Policy-makers responding by adopting tougher and more rigid laws and regulations – internationally, regionally and nationally

44 MWH has a core value to be a trustworthy business partner. Honesty, professionalism, ethical behaviour and integrity with our staff, clients and supply chain are integral to the way we do business.

Robert Uhler, Chief Executive Officer, MWH Global, USA

Corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development, and the fight against it is imperative. With our considerable resources, practical experience and front line position, international business must take a stand, for it is no longer enough to simply be against corruption or other unethical business practices. Global business leaders must be fully engaged in eradicating them and levelling the competitive playing field for all.

Alan L. Boeckmann, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Fluor Corporation, USA **K** MTN subsists on five brand values – integrity, leadership, relationships, innovation and can-do. These values are the essence of MTN, defining our people, policies and practices. Integrity is a promise that we have made to all our stakeholders – of fairness, transparency, honesty and accountability in all our dealings. As we maintain our leadership position in Nigerian telecommunications, we are committed to also leading the way in zero tolerance for corrupt practices.

Ahmad Farroukh, Chief Executive Officer, MTN Nigeria, Nigeria

Gur objective in this area is to make it clear to governments that the business interest lies in the widest possible international commitment to anti-corruption rules, so that we may compete on a level playing field on a sound ethical and legal basis.

Paul Skinner, Chairman, Rio Tinto, United Kingdom

Good governance is a requirement for sustainable development and effective markets. StatoilHydro supports the global fight against corruption.

> Helge Lund, President and Chief Executive Officer, StatoilHydro, Norway

There is no business which is so important that we will jeopardize our business ethics.

Lars Rebien Sorensen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Novo Nordisk, Denmark

Global, Multi-industry Initiatives

Even companies demonstrating anti-corruption leadership are facing challenges that they cannot effectively solve themselves, i.e. eliminating facilitation payments and the prisoner's dilemma. Four mutually supportive global, multiindustry initiatives work together with companies to address such collective business challenges:

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

ICC speaks with authority on behalf of enterprises from all sectors around the world. In 2005, it issued a revised version of its Rules and Recommendations to Combat Extortion and Bribery, first published in 1977. The ICC Commission on Anti-Corruption brings together experts from a wide range of business sectors and national backgrounds. It promotes self-regulation by enterprises in confronting extortion and bribery and provides business input into international initiatives to fight corruption. For more information, visit www.iccwbo.org or contact <u>viviane.schiavi@iccwbo.org</u>.

Transparency International (TI)

TI, the global coalition against corruption, addresses corruption through a wide range of tools and over 90 national chapters. In 2002, it worked with a multistakeholder and international steering committee of companies, business associations, academics, union representatives and civil society organizations to publish an anti-corruption code entitled Business Principles for Countering Bribery. This code formed the basis for the PACI Principles, developed with the World Economic Forum. Since then, insights gained from workshops held around the world have led to the development of a suite of tools to support companies in developing and implementing anti-corruption policies, monitoring their effectiveness and publicly reporting their results. For more information, visit www.transparency.org or contact businessprinciples@transparency.org.

United Nations Global Compact (GC)

In 2004, a 10th Principle was added to the United Nations Global Compact, a multistakeholder initiative, sending a strong signal that the private sector shares responsibility for eliminating corruption. The principle states: "Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery." The adoption of the 10th Principle commits the almost 4,000 Global Compact participants not only to avoid bribery, extortion and other forms of corruption, but also to develop policies and concrete programmes to address it. The United Nations Global Compact is a voluntary initiative with a mandatory requirement for business participants to disclose, on an annual basis, performance changes in the issue areas. For more information, visit www.unglobalcompact.org or contact <u>makinwa@un.org</u>.

World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI)

PACI is a platform for companies to commit themselves to develop, implement and monitor their anti-corruption programmes through peer network meetings and provision of private sector-driven support tools. Driven by the private sector, the initiative helps to consolidate industry efforts in fighting corruption and shape the evolving regulatory framework. PACI was initiated by World Economic Forum member company CEOs in Davos in 2004. Since then, the PACI Principles for Countering Bribery have been developed, and the nature of the initiative has become multi-industry and multinational. The Principles have received CEO commitment from almost 150 companies, representing an annual turnover of more than US\$ 800 billion. For more information, visit www.weforum.org/paci or contact paci@weforum.org.

Falck Group believes in and operates for a sustainable development and growth based on ethics principles. Falck Group has in place a full system of corporate governance to obtain such goals and, furthermore, shares these cultural values with all employees.

Achille A. Colombo, Managing Director, Falck Group Italy, Switzerland Corruption not only attacks the moral fibre of our society and the integrity of our markets, but it also conflicts with the core principles on which Sanlam's business strategy is based. Our commitment to our ethical values and our strategic vision demand that we shall not tolerate any form of corruption in our business dealings.

Johan van Zyl, Group Chief Executive, Sanlam, South Africa