

Europe reaching US in World Power through “Non Statehood” Optimal Governance

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Abstract The European Union was been shaped by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, thus more than half a century ago, as a “non Statehood”, then as a Union of States (now already 28 and with other 5 on the negotiation for membership status), after the catastrophe of the World War II. The attitude of the two world blocks at that time was grim. Both the two great powers at the time, US and Soviet Union, were sure of the failure of the take off of this apparently “outer space” entity without sovereignty reflecting the sceptical attitude reserved to Gustav Mahler when he presented his master concerts in the dodecaphonic notes, an outrage for the flat minded traditional school. An entity where some important testing countries refused in referendums to accept a Constitution aiming to develop a welfare state following the “Soziale Marktwirtschaft”, the social market economy of private entrepreneurs and public governance, founding its institutional base on the theories of “non Statehood”, as the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation between XVI and XIX centuries. In 2014 EU has become the second world power, following the US and before China, even if in some non scientific statistics the Union is not yet considered a unique market, financial system, defence and security alliance, the highest technologic advanced international region, having the best the social and environmental living standards with the lowest inequality index, as shown by the excellence of the Zurich Polytechnic University in the KOF yearly indexing, Europe as a Global Power has become a reality overcoming the crises spread in 2008 from the US and is now in the recovery stage, with the Euro come down from its high, when the Dollar debacle came after 2008, but now pushing the real economic recovery for the next 2-3 years. A picture that is examined in this paper with a full horizon through the new theories of International Relations, of Growth and the fifth generation hybrid technologies, capable of benefiting from new revolutionary scientific discoveries in the military sector spreading to the most competitive and sophisticated industrial civil sectors worldwide. China is now facing a season of great political and structural economic reforms and for sure has in the EU the first and most reliable partner with many analogies with the EU founding history. Russia is missing the virtuous efforts of emerging countries becoming, day after day, more unpredictable

Keywords EU “non Statehood” - Europe Global Power - Dodecaphonic master piece Europe - Euro vs. US\$ now supporting real economy - China similarities processes - Russia in dangerous backwardness - Trans-Atlantic and Eastern Asia major players of the future Russia is missing the virtuous efforts of emerging countries becoming, day after day, unpredictable

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Apparently obvious but in fact rather difficult to achieve, Global Governance encountered some setbacks in the last two years due to the international financial, economic and strategic crisis starting with the implosion of the deficit in the balance of payments and public debt in the US and its “seismic waves” spreading to the European Union, with the clamorous case of the Greek claps and the emergency in the financial and economic system of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and for some aspects also of France. Also Asia and China could not escape some relevant negative impacts of the global crisis, as well as Japan, India and even Australia, although in different magnitudes but all imposing monetary policies and international standing quite far from the past financial strategies and practices. The same applied to most of the growing emerging countries: Brazil, Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Africa, Mexico. A case apart is Russia that is mainly an exporter of oil and gas with a dedicated industrial sector for defence but nothing like the market economy and productive system we have seen at work in the last 20 years, as this vast country still follows previous patterns and governance of the FSU, even trying to resurrect it in some way as alternative to reforms and contemporary competitive models of great advancement and growth independently from ideologies and backwardness thought.

As in the case of China, the impressive success story of the last half century, for the first time the waves of the crises arrived, showing in some ways the collateral impact of openness and market economy drive, with a slowing down and the moderate decline of the main real domestic index in sectors of trade, investments, real estate and real income per capita in PPP, while the out flow of investments rose quickly, partially rebalancing the situation.

The policy of the People’s Central Bank had been very wise with regard to reserve manoeuvres and great financial markets operations so monetary policy was rather stable vis-à-vis the US/RMB exchange rate even if liquidity in the system of course was not as expected by the Chinese operators. The lesson learnt was clear: there is no way to escape the shocks of international crises in any sector of global governance.

But all eyes were focussed first of all on Europe, with a spreading sentiment of failure pictured by influential media and think tank alerting. In fact we can now say that results show that we are nowhere near the end of the Union.

In International Relations - as had happened with the New Theory of Growth for Economics and Global Governance -, Europe is mainly focused on new theoretical constructivist approaches rather than following the obsolete and financially incompatible realism or neo-realism assumptions and prescriptions. Even the Pentagon cannot follow this path. And facing soon the negotiation on Transatlantic TTIP investments and free trade with US, the Eurozone was driven firmly out of the thunderstorm and was even able to increase its shares as reserve currency, relevance in daily capitalisation in the main stock exchanges, currency trade and financial markets coming close to the mighty US Dollar. The “non - Statehood” European Union had passed the “stress test” and is entering the Union of Banking systems with an exit strategy that is very severe for the more unbalanced public deficit member countries but flexible enough and adequate to allow the single countries to adapt measures and make drastic cuts in public budgets without losing the welfare state.

All this in a Union of 28 Member countries (with 5 membership negotiations already start) and 23 official languages, where the devolution of powers to the Union has implemented and re-written all the main pillars of Jean Bodin’s “Theory of Sovereignty” of 500 years ago, introducing for the national and regional governments very effective brand new powers in environment, higher education, university standards, welfare system, innovation and technology applications, service sectors, quality standards, agro-industrial production, health, citizen voice and accountability, equal gender, immigration, biologic protection of human and nature and a long list of the future main powers for the high ranking national states.

A remarkable result that China might now observe and interpret with regard to its own many peculiarities, as it has represented the most successful case of exiting from the global governance crisis ever seen in the last two centuries worldwide. The future will show more and more as the interrelations of the factors bringing growth or declines in the main powers, suggesting now to review past theories and practices or policies too firmly based on “national interest”, since there is already an evidence that the optimal solutions mainly came from countries assuming a rather moderate or even openly low national profile in using economic, financial and institutional tools and exit policies from the crises but showing high attention, determination and involvement based on a global vision and coherent international relations options.

China would probably be now in the best position to capitalize on this evolution and shape its future global governance horizon and strategy with more consideration for the European experience especially when comparing the not brilliant parallel trends and results achieved by the US in the same “stress test”. It would be a fair competition on the theories, models, practice and tools of world affairs future management. But the unavoidable condition is to step on the third wave of structural reform of the former “dirigistic dogmas” era before Deng Xiao Ping but now proceeding ahead with courageous reforms on the domestic governance and welfare priority needs, as the past could not match with the deep change of the future.

The impact of the reshaped international relations new practices, with the strength imposed by the unbelievable advancement of technologies both in civil and military fields, had already change the balance of power in security and “mighty” while the concepts of “capability” in power is measured more and more by the new weaponry of the fifth generation. We are already on the eve of their introduction on the arsenal and they will nullify the huge traditional military budgets of the past. Pentagon has reviewed entirely the philosophy and strategies of the military security 2030, with a growing interest for the hybrid industrial high tech factories and a progressive dismissing or sold out of traditional weaponry. The combined effect of really futuristic weapons and impressive innovative technologies will modify politics and societies around the world. We are now posing the questions of how the humanity and societies would not lose their central role as the unique factor determining the drive and governance of a progress which character already allow many scientist to evocate a trans-human world coming one. This millenaristic worries are also diffusing in absence of an intellectual and philosophic thinking explaining how we can dominate the future and bridging the past with these new horizons. In fact, we need to consider also the great up-grade of the life sciences and the fall-out of research and development of new generation of pharma and treatment prolonging the life in condition of autonomy and better standing. In other words, the human being will benefit of a real increase in quality of life and societies will be obliged to affinate the political institution that are asked to drive the process and advance in absence of domestic and international disorder and great tensions or conflicts.

Antagonists, reactionaries, rhetoric of the past, utopian of impossible futures and failure past will be the obstacles to be overcome; buffering the passage from nowadays to the next world assessment already on the way would be the main task of governments and educational systems. The risk of unpredictable or instrumental outcomes must be kept on the agenda. Tensions and conflicts will be unavoidable but to keep them at a small scale of deflagration represents already a wide, convergent transnational enforcement and an intellectual public opinion commitment.

Political scientists, sociologists and public policy top decision-making protagonists, constitutionalists, internationalists thinkers, technocrats and institutional leaderships must be aware and ready since now to the metamorphosis and generational passage of power in all the po-

litical, economic and cultural social segments. The ones capable for knowledge and human capital endowment to govern in the new planetarian environment will become the leadership of the “renaissance” of the XXI century.

The process comes from very far. Until a few years ago, the theories of International Relations were simply an American intellectual and governance school of thinking showing the growing role of the US in the world, a kind of field of competence for the greatest new outstanding power in the global economic, political, strategic and innovative sectors. The British School was an island of the core American thinking and the rest of the world mostly absent. FSU has not made any relevant contribution to the various schools related to the IR theories and even the Marxist political scientists did not dedicate themselves specifically to this main research area. They were in fact convinced that first it was not a real “science” but a derivative outcome from Philosophy, Public Diplomacy and Political Science; secondly, because of the monopoly of the power in the hands of very oppressive dirigistic regime, where these issues were not left to the researchers and experts but only to the institutional and military leadership.

Soviet Union *de facto* found convenient to resume the realism doctrines, with modest attempts to accept the great changes that have occurred in international affairs, losing the chance to board the last train for a competitive power role and dynamic economic and social governance. The change was not only promised by the American, European and moderately also by China but urgently invoked by all the major international actors in view of the financial and economic crises: the world foreign policy has suddenly entered a new age not being yet prepared to govern globalization and its wide interdependence conditionality.

In the next twenty years the world will be completely reshaped by the present metamorphosis. China is emerging as a new great power capable to foster International Relations evolution pursuing different schools of thinking and mixing the best of the poliedric theoretical background and specifically of the most recent, mostly European developed new theories of “constructivism”. But still the domestic need of deep reforms and the external tensions are posing China in a dilemma: how to reform without too much conflicting with traditionalism and a power organization in some way already obsolete.

The political and institutional refitting would need to be done without unrest in economic and social system but this is really a severe challenge and at the end democracy as such is not a model that could be indicated as updated and efficient is not in the fundamental values of freedom and citizen sovereignty through elective institutions, a new format in some kind of viable transitional time compatible with the peculiarity of Asian and China cultures, habits and power organization behind the Communist Party ruling power and coming from very far in the history and predominant values and culture. This struggle is on the way and Europe is the most keen in understanding the complexity of the next reforms jump ahead of the Chinese giant.

The international scholars, experts and politicians who confuse the difficulty to proceed speedily in the reforms with restauration step back are showing a poor notion of the situation on the ground, of the tensions and more recently also of the growing terroristic activities in some part of the western and southern part of the Country. Also the disputes on marginal problems or single events as a sign of dangers or military external threaten, with a chain of reactions and counter measures too much voiced even if not practiced by neighboring countries and Asia Pacific other powers would at the end not help the process and might provoke a reason of political regression, as in the case of cyberspace and the approach to a proper balance of security and Internet openness.

In the last few years so many events have been changing the world “scenario” that all the concepts and assumptions of even only five years ago have to be at least reviewed if not abandoned. The change occurring around us is great. Politologists as well as economists and

internationalists are accused of not having been able to perceive what was going on at a global level, even if the announcements and winds of great, irreversible factors of reshape in the political, financial, economic, strategic governance were very clear and scientifically perceptible. Economists, political scientists, diplomats, strategists, banks and corporates indulged too much in simply imagining normal seasonal crises and setbacks but not a seismically wave of the dimension of the one start in the US in 2008, correlated to the questionable wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Middle East on fire.

This attitudes smell too much of instrumental and opportunistic attitudes by the leaderships of public and private sectors of the main advanced and relevant world players. Not only was the alert for incoming shocks given by only a few outstanding scholars and fellows - even if many of us also had been giving warnings during conferences, papers and public statements - but also the consequences had been underestimated in Europe, Asia and Latin America.

Just imagine that even the “soft” Basel 2 agreement on banking risk management, on more severe market rules and clear capital standards ratio to incorporate Market Risks and the treatment of Double Default Effects, five years ago had been announced and accepted but postponed by USA, Russia, China, Japan and partially even by UK, just to mention the main countries, until the arrival, two years ago, of Basel 3. Now Basel III has arrived and we are witnessing the same attitude: postponing, relaxing, wondering and guessing. Only Euro Zone had shown coherence and political will to perform properly the new financial and banking requirements, even if some countries were in recession, stagnation, high unemployment and astronomic public budgets deficits.

Eurozone enforced a tight monetary policy for the financial and banking sector at the high price of a temporary reduction of the real economy expansion and then the significant decrease of the GPP PPP per capita to negative annual percentages, in the highest public debt countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Ireland but also in less voiced way to France, Slovenia, and the Baltic’s countries. The shocking decision of the EcoFin and the European Central Bank to “de facto” suspend for some years the sovereignty of Greece over financial and budget policy, nominating a “troika” of High Commissioner (ECB, EU and IMF) to ensure the appropriate governance of the Country had helped the other countries to avoid the breaking of the Maastricht rules and Basel 3 severe banking system regulatory provisions. I keep the focus on the experience of Italy, to avoid the uncomfortable feelings from being unilateral in my critical judgments. Italy started facing, two years ago, the stalemate by dismissing the incumbent Government of Premier Berlusconi and enforcing the situation through a technocratic and Euro-compatible policy of “blood, sweat and tears” to reestablish the lost credibility with the trustable Premier Mario Monti’s Government followed by the ones of Enrico Letta and now Matteo Renzi, who is the current President of the Council of the European Union, the top governing body of the EU. Now the job is not completed as the reforms encounter Italian parliamentary filibustering and public opinion rumoring. But even Italy is now starting again to strengthen competitiveness, jobs, social urgent policies, relaunching entrepreneurship reversing the race to disaster in which Italy was kept for ten years.

Of course also “Law and Order” have been imposed by Justice Courts and Security Corps with severe measures against corruption, grafting, rackets and widely diffused fiscal evasion. A thunderstorm that had found in the President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano, in his constitutional power of both President of the Supreme Judges Council-CSM and the Republic’s Defense Council, the great guide and politically conductor. We cannot deny that the pressures coming from the EU, ECB and NATO were so urgent that Italy had to choose between staying with dignity in the Union or abandoning and ending up like Greece. And we cannot hide the fact that a large part of the political leadership of the ten previous years, apart from short

experiences of correction of the political situation, have been under severe investigations and many of them - belonging to all the political parties, without any distinction and tolerance - were arrested and also legally convicted.

The second push to finally demonstrate that the governance of the European Union and the European Central Bank was the one of a great power arrived when Cyprus, member of the EU and Euro, from the very beginning safe haven for money laundering and shadow capital previously from former Yugoslavia and after from Russia but not only, was facing its fatal destiny: in mid 2013, banks were closed for two weeks on the order of the EU and ECB, without any previous announcement, all the hundred millions of euro belonging to Russian individuals and companies - well investigated in the previous months and years, under the chapter of illegal trafficking, corruption, grafting and criminal acts -, were confiscated and used as partial coverage of the enormous Cyprus Public Debt under the control of the European Central Bank.

Hostility surrounding EU performances as global power is floating in media and some sectors of intellectual life both in Europe and at international scale, just because European Union is the irreducible antagonist of weak thinking and fake representation and diffused prejudices utilized in a wild, instrumental way by the real, dangerous main actors of the age we have seen in the last years all over the world, also in China of course, but even more in Russia and also in US. Corruption, grafting, drug trafficking, terrorism, weak rule of law, misgovernment is affecting even mature and experienced democracies as well as not democratic governance. Years to be forgotten in many senses and I have mentioned some of the reasons straight away. I simply wrote down a list of these events that any theory of International Relations has been in the condition to capture and connect in a frame of robust and scientifically convincing way. The economic and financial shocks were produced by the obsolescence of the traditional governance model, first of all by the lack of transnational rules and guidelines in the crucial area of the globalization impact on the key factors of monetary, banking and real economy patterns, aspects that had not even been questioned until the last few years.

Each school of new theories of growth and governance has been virtually blasted by the more wide conformist and traditionalist sectors of the leaderships, even in the academic community and political life, in the West as in the East. Now the new theories are governing the most advanced countries, *in primis* the European Union, and found citizenship worldwide. The same has happened with International Relations and many segments and disciplines of Social Science, not to talk of the astonishing upsurge of knowledge in the sciences of all kind.

The arrival of the "new" always met many hostile barriers and some millenarist attitudes. In the United States and in Europe there still are growing concerns about sharing the future strategy for managing global governance, specifically from the part of the society sectors that believed that, at the end, nothing would really have changed. The European leaders in Berlin and Chancellor Angela Merkel in Beijing in recent days left wide room to discuss the future rather than to celebrate the past, even if in 1989 there were such important turning point events, as the end of the FSU, the reunification of Germany, the sunset of bipolarism and the burial for the Jalta order already more than half a century old.

What is remaining is the United Nations obsolete but still unique common ground for a common political and social debate and really few concrete steps on the direction of global governance. The flourishing of G7 (former G 8 reduced to 7 after the expulsion of Russia, due to the annexation of Crimea and still pressuring for annexation of Donetsk Eastern region of Ukraine, events that have isolated Russia and created a widespread sentiments in the world of the dangerous strategy in EurAsia caressed by Moscow), G20 and many other sub groups of countries aiming to find the magic potion to give life to the world governance had to face the walls of the national interests and the veto of five countries in the Security Council.

The future will show how to overcome this lack of updated aims and scope of the United Nations and the solutions suitable for a more “equal inter pares” participation in the Security Council of the 5 plus ten 10 members, with a yearly rotation, not on the base of the well recognized and historical merits achieved in the second world war but for the more urgent and indispensable reasons of the future global governance, that can’t be left to any hegemonic approach as the same China President Xi’, in a recent statements on his Country foreign policy, as a great sign in a direction of international relations founding their reasons and scopes in the growth, development and peaceful resolution of controversies around the world, where the military multinational enforcement is really the ultimate option. Anyway, the present “status quo” is close to the end and it would be wise for the main powers to prepare alternative proposals before the events will create the alternative situations.

The wider Transatlantic system (that means Europe West and East - except Russia with Belarus - but including Ukraine, now closely associated with the EU, with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area-DCFTA, as well as Turkey with free customs agreement and also in the negotiation for membership (and the wide room left to partnership with Latin Americas countries through the bilateral Association Agreements), is a challenging negotiation to find a format, a pattern on how to reform the basic architecture of the economic Transatlantic, diversified system. But in fact would be also a good opportunity to review the “democratic” practices until now followed in a passive attitude - with consequences in the credibility and reciprocal confidence and trust between the two side of the Atlantic -, in order to face up to the “planetarian” developments and change, to quote Edgar Morin’s controversial but famous essay of ten years ago on “How to Govern the complexity of the future” (Morin, UNESCO 2000) but even better referring to the less politically compromised Al-Rodhan main text book of Oxford University Press later quoted (Al-Rodhan NRF -2011- The politics of emerging strategic technologies-implications for geopolitics human enhancement and human destiny. Palgrave Macmillan).

Apparently very few leaders paid attention to the “complexity” in the almost fifteen years of the third millennium. The so-called “East” has been lamenting for years that it was a victim of the invisible hands of the obscure powers beyond economic and financial globalization. But do not include in the East the Asiatic emerging countries, first of all China, India or Turkey or the really top ranking fully emerged Japan or even the Latin America Brazil and Chile, where similar fairy tales are not even taken into account. They are feeling day after day comfortable with globalization as many countries around the world and in Europe first of all.

But the two main powers of the Jalta table, US and Russia, seem to feel less comfortable, of course for different reasons. The growing share of international trade, foreign investments, highest innovative top ranking position, fifth generation technologies transforming the military and civil advanced sectors into completely different system and industrial complexes, due to the introductions in photonics, in alternative energies, outer space playground for systematic surveillance of any kind of last option strike, are giving to the US and Europa a kind of relief from external dangers and conditionality. I said only the two powers and not quoting China as I recently read President Xi’s very statement on the 60th anniversary of the Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence on June 29, 2014: “ We should respect the right of a country to choose its own social system and model of development and oppose the attempt to legitimate government of a country through illegal means seeking self-interest or imposing one’s view”. “ Flexing military muscle only reveals the lack of moral ground or vision rather than reflecting one’s strength “. “To uphold global peace and promote common development remains a daunting challenge facing mankind”. Cooperation generates strength while isolation only leads to weakness”. We should respect the diversity of civilizations and promote exchanges, dialogue and

peaceful and harmonious coexistence among different civilizations and nations”. “We should uphold fairness and justice to build up a new type of International Relations”. I have found this statement as quite illuminating the great distance between the political driving inspiration of China and the Russia attitudes, recently shown in practice.

When Dmitry Medvedev¹ was Russia’s President, he stated that during the Soviet Union times and until the last years there were horrible pages, not to forget the killing of millions people. I quote his comments, as I have found in his blog, to recognize his courage and the appreciation for “politically correct” judgment of past history. “We had, all over wider Europe and in large part of the world, a very shadow and dark night over half of the last century. We move on but we do not forget the mistakes made almost everywhere. Let me start remembering Europe as a particular case. Populism, demagoguery, nihilism, militarism, cult of personality, ethnic cleansing, racism, slavery, offences to human rights belong to the not-forgettable heritage of history, also of the history we are all committed not to repeat. Medvedev issued the toughest condemnation of Stalinism by a Russian leader in a decade. His rejection of attempts to “justify” repression raises questions about whether the Kremlin is taking a tougher line against partial rehabilitation of the dictator’s image.

President Medvedev’s video blog condemning Stalin appeared on October 30, 2009, a day of remembrance for victims of Soviet repression. His historic commentary also counters a number of recent attempts to present Stalin’s record in a positive light. Over the summer, Stalinist lyrics were restored in the Moscow metro, and textbooks calling Stalin “an efficient manager” were published. The Kremlin also launched a commission to study “historic falsification”, particularly regarding the Soviet Union’s conduct during Second World War; this led to speculation that the authorities were increasingly worried about how Russian history, and Stalin in particular, were being presented. “Let’s just think about it: millions of people died as a result of terror and false accusations – millions,” Medvedev wrote. “But even today you still hear voices claiming that those innumerable victims were justified for some higher national purpose. I believe no national progress, successes or ambitions can develop at the price of human misery and loss. There is no excuse for repression.” The Russian President in 2009 also focused was careful to draw a line between Russia’s incredible achievements during the period and Stalin’s crimes – attributing victory in the Second World War and industrial modernization to the people rather than to Stalin. “Stalin’s crimes cannot diminish the heroic deeds of the people who triumphed in the Great Patriotic War, who made our country a mighty industrial power, and who raised our industry, science and culture to leading world standards.”

More than this, Medvedev admitted that the oil- and gas-driven economy has no long-term future.² Modernization means to accept the challenges of globalization”. He stressed that Russia must achieve the status of global power on a fundamentally new basis. The country’s prestige and national well-being, he noted, cannot be determined by past achievements. At the cost of tremendous efforts Russia became one of the influential industrial powers of the 20th century; in the 21st century, Russia once again requires all-round modernisation: introduction of the latest medical, energy and information technologies; development of space and telecommunications systems, and dramatically improving energy efficiency”. The words are sounding close to the Gorbachev spring in the great reform of FSU through “perestroika” and “glasnost”. But we have seen in the following years a great change in the policies and strategies of Kremlin becoming unpredictable day after day.

¹ President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev: in the Remembrance Day of Victims of Political Repression.

² The oil- and gas-driven economy was hit hard as commodities prices plunged late last year.

The second problem is the energy interdependence of Europe. Ironically, this problem is currently a source of division between the EU and Russia, although it would seem, on the contrary, that it should help to unite them. In this sense, the implementation of the Nord Stream and South Stream projects should reverse this trend. A third obstacle to convergence is the difficulty in the movement of people, even worse now after the Ukraine events. Easy to promise, difficult to work out. Russian history has seen many other attempts to modernize and reform which all encountered fierce resistance of the "aparatnici". Medvedev and behind him his "mentor" Putin (as now it appears in clear way) never focus on the factors producing the modernization declared as the "priority" of the country.

Which are the factors producing introduction of the latest medical, energy and information technologies; development of space and telecommunications systems, and dramatically improving energy efficiency? Following the last political science and economics theories, they become now respectively human capital, structural reforms, market openness, international confidence, transparent business environment, absence of endemic corruption. A therapy Russia must adopt in concrete terms and not only in the official statements. Europe is the first in line waiting for this magic moment to become true.

A number of once marginal countries are assuming a great role of stabilization around the world as they have skipped almost one century of main errors of the "nation state" crude realism and its consequences, of the negative attitude to market economy and to openness. And they are not even attracted by neo-realism, nor liberal or neo-liberal, or constructivism and Marxian theories. In fact, the main turning point of new powers in Asia, the Middle East and recently Latin America is the abandoning of the consolidated dialectic between already obsolete or abstract theories - inspired by realism, neo-realism and the others already mentioned schools - with the assessment of differently called multilateral, multipolar or multipartnership regional approaches, aiming more or less at the same scope, that is still in progress but already playing a major role.

An extraordinary, great, pragmatic change that came within a relatively low conflict international environment, a result that appears to be the most precious "return on investments" for their goals of growth and competitiveness worldwide but also for the new drive of the foreign policy of the US and Russia. I do not mention Europe of the 28 again and many of the neighboring countries because Europe was the first laboratory of this alternative radical political, social, economic and security way of approaching the institutional building in the age of globalization.

As we read and hear in conferences and congresses, there are some voices celebrating the "nation state" as the protagonist of the future, in contrast to the supposed menaces of globalization, I simply would like to remind you that in the Statute of the ECB-European Central Bank, the word "state", "nation" and "countries" have never even been mentioned, being the Euro Zone members simply "regions" belonging to the EMU. The Euro has been the successful conclusion of a convergence process started 30 years before, passing through the EMU and the Maastricht "criteria" and finally establishing the monetary Union and the Central Bank in Frankfurt. In the 12-month period to September 2009, combined direct and portfolio investment recorded cumulated net inflows of EUR 343 billion, compared with net inflows of EUR 82 billion in the preceding 12-month period.

This was mainly the result of a substantial rise in net inflows in portfolio investment (from EUR 185 billion to EUR 478 billion), largely reflecting higher net inflows in money market instruments (which increased from EUR 26 billion to EUR 237 billion). And in the current account, surpluses in goods (EUR 4.0 billion) and services (EUR 1.3 billion) soared again, with a recorded increase at the highest percentage in the last years, even in presence of a lagging

and weak GDP per capita. “Old Europe” is in fact a very “Young” and courageous Europe. The architecture of the European experience will be a main heritage to political scientists and the thinkers of governance and public policy in future decades. Even the Constitution does not represent a real priority and the “identity” headache is not a widely diffused syndrome in all the 27 plus the neighboring countries. The change is impressive and has taken place in less than twenty years.

The pragmatic approach to the world is looking like some of the best aspects of already known previous schools and theories of International Relations, but in fact are brand new and very much still in progress. In the future, the whole world will appreciate it and be grateful. Now we feel how far we already are from the “father” of the “realism” school of International Relations thought: Hans Morgenthau and his “Politics Among Nations” (1960), as well as from Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism approaches, so fascinating in his “Theory of International Politics” (Waltz, 1979). They remain cornerstones of the intellectual heritage of the philosophic and political investigations but no longer suitable to be applied to the present and the future.

That is why we wonder whether International Relations is still a discipline or if it has already changed its nature, becoming the science of governing the complex systems of all sectors, fields and expression of the human organization and history. Policy, Philosophy and History cannot be absent in any process of integration and transnational build-up. Just to add a pertinent quotation: “The Chinese were probably influenced less by the example of the United States itself than by US-backed examples closer to home, such as Japan, South Korea, and – although they would not admit it – Taiwan”, wrote Philip Zelikow in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs (November/December 2009) dedicated to 1989 and the Fall of Communism, in a provocative article that begins from the title: “The suicide of the East?”

A counterbalancing answer to “Suicide of the West”, written almost fifty years before, in 1964, was given by James Burnham, who radically argued that modern liberalism had lost the fervor of classical liberalism. The modern variant treated peace and security as equal to or greater than the commitment to preserving freedom (Burnham, 1964). Since the focus on peace denigrated the use of power against a ruthless foe, Burnham predicted that the West was slowly committing suicide. A neo-cons last remembrance.

Now to my paper’s initial aims and scope, which was to draw attention to the growing improvements and diffusion of International Relations outside the cultural and political birthplace of the UK and then of the United States, the motherlands of this discipline that remain for sure a cornerstone of scientific and applied studies on war and peace among nations, on growth, development, failures and success around the world, after WW II. In fact, until a few years ago, the theories of International Relations were simply an American intellectual heritage and a government science, with direct implications and interconnections with the growing role of the US in the world. Until the Eighties only inside the US think tanks and universities was it possible to achieve a good command of the notions and crucial concepts of power and political use of military capabilities for the end of international order and hegemony.

The Former Soviet Union and other hegemonic powers preferred to focus on applied foreign policy as the real science of International Relations, in this way impeding the coexistence of any dialectic between the official foreign policy and the free scientific advancement of knowledge and competence of scientists and politologists on the main drivers of the relations between countries, societies and the related clashes. A kind of field of competence for the greatest power in the global economic, political, strategic and innovative sectors. The British School became, decade after decade, an island of the core American thinking while the rest of the world was sitting in the theater and mostly absent from any floor relevant performances. In other words, FSU has not given any really relevant contribution to the various schools of

thinking related to the IR theories and even the Marxist politologists have dedicated themselves only marginally to this main area of research. Internationalism was the flag of a much more complex discipline.

The reasons are many, as I mentioned above. First, because Russian scientists were mostly convinced that it was not a real “science” but a derivative offspring of Philosophy or Political Science; secondly because of the monopoly of the power in the hands of an autocratic regime, where these issues could not be left to researchers and experts but only to the institutional and military leadership. When 1989 arrived, Russia tried to make up lost time but in contradictory and confused ways, we have to admit. Until the recent international upturns waking up the entire world, even in the Nineties and in all the last ten years of the beginning of the third millennium, Russia found it more convenient to partially resume the realism doctrines of the past, with modest attempts to integrate the great changes in international affairs that have occurred in the last twenty years. The more critical international experts try to demonstrate that the Kremlin’s shifting back was favored largely by the George W. Bush doctrine of power and use of military force in international relations. Again the neo-cons and the “strong powers” of defense industries and oil inspired protagonists with them were conditioning the White House. A radical judgment that is anyhow backed by a robust series of good arguments. I recently had to buy Andrei Tsygankov’s “Russia’s Foreign Policy, Change and Continuity in National Identity” (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers) to better know the reality and the last decade’s events from a really Russian perspective and not through the intermediation of other political, personal views (Tsygankov, 2006).

The rich picturing of the undertaking and at the same time change and continuity went a little bit too far in compromising the needs of the historic reviewing of the FSU’s and Russia’s Foreign Policy with the main concepts of the International Relations theories and advanced studies. He explained he had utilized a dual methodology, as in Martin Wight’s conceptualization. The result is a scientifically rich update of Russian foreign affairs issues and a strong support for Putin’s new course in the political leadership of the Country. But fatally Tsygankov was not able to analyze the very latest changes in the international world order that have taken place after the book was published, starting with the Obama Presidency and the implications of the global scale of choices and policies of the new decision makers’ leadership. No utopian programs or idealistic Wilsonian wishes are on the floor, as some commentators argue, but a tangible, well perceived worldwide discontinuity in the American leadership and in the use of power.

We shall have to wait for a new edition to interpret his attitude toward this change. Iraq, Afghanistan, the Great Middle East, Pakistan, the ever-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Africa and Latin America, now the case of Iran’s irresistible attraction towards the nuclear option, the impressive affinity with the European Union strategies and with the leadership of the major protagonists’ countries have been completed with the attempt to propose non prejudicial relations with Russia based on mutual confidence. And Europe quickly found its tuning again with the other side of the Atlantic. Now the time has come, in these days, for the last but not the least chapter of the new US reshaped foreign policy agenda: Asia, China, Japan and the alliances in these crucial region reaching the Great Middle East, the Islam with which “America will never be at war”, but fighting terrorist and military organized fundamentalism, President Obama said in his first visit to Cairo six years ago.

There is no G2 on the horizon, as the China-US elective relations might suggest, as the European Union is the new entry, but the assessment and recognition of the real terms of political, economic, financial and military power characterizing the wide Asia Pacific region. Where Russia has an influential role at the condition of working out a brand new constructive strategy

of international relations for this crucial part of the world. Europe, by the way, it is making great efforts in this direction.

As I mentioned above, realism and liberalism, with their mild version of “neo”, were driving American theories and overall studies and research. Even the dialectics between different theories were almost a monopoly of the main, outstanding think-tanks and university institutes on the East Coast of the Atlantic Ocean. So neorealism and neoliberalism, positivism and pragmatism, constructivism and reflectivism, traditionalism and pluralism thinkers were diluting the too-radical views of the former over the latter, front runners: realism and liberalism. To those familiar with the discipline, as all of you are, with the academic sociology and political science implications, the title of this section of my paper sounds like questioning what had been an evergreen.

Echoing the headline of Stanley Hoffmann’s famous article “An American social science: International Relations” (1977), in the last ten years as many as three publications have been entitled ‘International Relations: still an American social science?’ (Kahler 1993; S. Smith 2000a; Crawford and Jarvis 2001). Since the 1950s, when Alfred Grosser posed the provocative question whether International Relations was becoming an ‘American specialty’ (1956), the classification of the discipline as an American social science has been accepted by an increasing majority of scholars all over the world (Grosser, 1956).

Of course, this did not prevent a critical minority of scholars from waging fierce emancipation struggles against what they perceived to be an intellectual American hegemony and American ethnocentrism (Booth 1979; Gareau 1981, 1982, 1983; Alker and Biersteker 1984; Krippendorff 1987). Others have criticized the idea of an American hegemony over the discipline as a distorting image which is part of the problem rather than part of the solution (S. Smith 1987; Jørgensen 2000; Groom and Mandaville 2001). In the face of these controversies, some scholars tried to expose the status of IRs as an American social science to empirical scrutiny (Holsti 1985; Goldmann 1995; Wæver 1998a), Then Rodrik “One Economy, many recipes (Rodrik, 2007) .

I quote from “European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions”, written by “the Independent German Historian” Jörg Friedrichs in 2004. The concept of “peripheries” and “centers” has been for a long time the accepted methodology - West and East - to interpret the IRs, a kind of revival of the “geopolitics” approach so tragically affirmed in the age of the imperials everlasting power in the world history. For almost 2,500 years. But since the last century and even more after 1989, geopolitics has become quite naïf and a new scenario has grown quickly, not even fully perceived by the protagonists themselves. The case of the European Union is emblematic. Before and obviously even more after German reunification, it started playing a role as global “soft” power in many areas and issues, utilizing new tools of governance never before seen in action by the nation-states. But the founder of the EU with the Treaty of Rome signed by the first six members in 1957 had no doubt to choose for the loyalty to “pacta sunt servanda”: “the transitional agreements and understanding must be fulfilled and no national sovereignty among the 28 countries member of the Union might be invoked”.

Could we conclude that this “soft” has been less effective than the traditional “hard” or “stark” showdowns of the great powers? The events are telling us how influential and effective the European decision making process is, and the Lisbon Treaty story is here to show the prevailing factors of convergence and interdependence of the member countries, as Ireland and Poland have learnt so openly and clearly. This might be considered also as the EU way to keep an appropriate distance from the pressures from “nation-states”. As I said above, a laboratory of global governance was at work far from the past theoretical schemes increasingly followed

by many researchers and specialists. Probably not really through free choice but rather because of the limits and permanent constraints of European institutional building, after the Treaty of Rome in 1957, European Studies started to become increasingly relevant to IRs.

Today the quotations and the bibliography of European thinkers and authors very frequently enter IR books and papers. The academic community is populated by growing numbers of specialist and distinguished scholars working in the main universities and think-tanks of the continent. Even some European regional experts, from Scandinavia and the Baltic countries, or from the Berlin-Paris-Rome triad are getting more followers and scientific respect around the world. Not to mention the three main players – Germany, France and of course the United Kingdom – but even Italy, where international disciplines are the most followed in the choices of postgraduates and doctoral students.

And China has become a producer of papers, articles and scientific literature in International Relations as demonstrated by the dynamic activity of the main universities and also by a Conference I was attending couple of months ago at UIBE in Beijing. These are the intellectual and scientific steps but are main steps as underlining that the Country would better do jumping ahead of the rebalancing a too much economic and trading China with the great power China, in need of scientific support to find the right direction in the studies of International Relations and in the applied outcomes.

Looking all around we couldn't imagine we are still in the era of the IRs purely an American science. We European share with the US a great intellectual confidence and reciprocal freedom of ideas. In fact, we believe our universities are very competitive and on the average even better than the American ones, as we are staying in the strict brackets of the Bologna Process, at the beginning a close standard for the EU members countries and now already with more than 50 countries adopting the same European university standard.

But what's about Russia? The international visibility of publications, journals and events in English by major Institutions show a clear sign of willingness to be part of the IRs debate with the appropriate tools. Who is accustomed to having difficulties in finding valuable sources of the Russian view on global policies and affairs, these collections of papers and articles have the same significance as in Europe with the widespread of IRs research and relevant contributions. That is why we can today affirm that International Relations are still a relevant American discipline, but no longer a purely American science, as we have already a worldwide distinguished and populated area of studies integrating and enlarging the appreciated contributions from the best known American institutions and publications. Still, we are dependent on the robustness and long-lasting intellectual heritage of our colleagues from there and this must be underlined not as a lack of alternative sources but as the prevailing of a dialectic on international relations and new advancements that is really starting, as never before, in the main, great think-tank of the US, encouraging a transnational dimension of the scientific and cooperative activities of all.

Also in this sense, we are in a new era of partnership overcoming already obsolete antagonisms. The developments and metamorphoses I am talking about are at the first stage of proof and, we must say, they are compatible both with the even stronger convergence between the two sides of the Atlantic – which has demonstrated again to be a real driver for getting out of the international crisis and instability – but also with other main actors, such as the new Asian powers, China, India and the already grown up from the war Japan.

Also the revival of outsiders such as the non-aligned movement must be taken into account. Those who in the beginning perceived the European emersion and dynamism in this discipline as a sign of declining of the US have to review their assumptions. We are simply redefining the factors determining the power capability of the major actors in the planetarian International

Relations. The power in future decades will be increasingly measured by indicators of human capital, welfare standard, applied research and development, tradable goods production, innovative technologies, alternative for energy, gender perspectives and roles, behavioral sciences, life science, climate and environment, human rights, migration flows, young generation leadership, new values and cultural sensibilities in the integration of the differences without losing the identities, a mission that in the past was the main task of the religions and their social and political relevance.

The OECD has already prepared the ground, offering a new dataset of indicators evaluated and weighted following the most advanced “pooling” quantitative analyses, officially presented in Busan (Korea) four years ago, a model of comparative approach to more than 200 social, political, economic, environmental, educational, defense, conflict, peace, ethnicity, genders, generation, productivity, competitiveness and regional variables, together with an informatics engine investigating the most relevant global choices and governance policies capable to navigate the stormy waters of the future complexity.

These phenomena will fatally rank in the future the real power countries and regions around the world more endowed with these strategic factors. By the way, the initiators of the New Theories of Growth, the so called post-neoclassic Solow assumptions, Romer, Mankiw and Weil have been very criticized until yesterday, at least until the moment when the Deutsche Bank Research Unit did not go further with the Formel-G model already consolidated and a point of reference for scholars and policy makers (Manikiw, Romer, Weil, 1992).

At the end of the day, the negative aspects of the unilateralist foreign policies and the reluctance of many European and worldwide major allied countries to fully share the ten years of US policies and choices from 200 to 2007, have much more endangered the American supremacy than the pluralism in the theories of IR.

It seems that the dialectic on these issues is healthy not only for foreign policy but even more for public budgets, for the real economy and for the soundness of the global financial situation. Before investing important shares in defense spending, all leaderships must evaluate the cost and benefits, the returns and positive “fallout” to innovation and civil industrial competitiveness of ambitious programs that – in the age of very sophisticated military technologies – might have a marginal relevance for the strategic balance of forces, but a high burden, negative for the tax payers and the citizens, a civil society not willing to be silenced by any political power. “No Man is an Island” is a very well-known title of a spiritual meditation by Thomas Merton (Merton, 1983). The US President seems to know well what the romance was intending. Apparently yes, during the last years something changed deeply and probably also the universal message he is giving, both to faithful believers and non. But did the Russian leadership refurbish the bookshelves at home, keeping it out for summer reading or at least start thinking intensively about what it means? After what happened in Ukraine in the last months we have the proof that they did not.

Completely different is the situation in the US. In only a few months, growing support and also vibrant opposition, at home more than abroad, was mounting seven years ago around the new American President on a vision and actions profoundly different from the ones of the past. But he has shown to be strongly pragmatic and not simply an idealist as many presumed at the beginning. He is a pragmatic, non realism minded leader very appropriate for the future global governance.

Probably also Vladimir Putin, so different in character and attitudes, would at the beginning have judged Obama as an idealist fighter of irresolvable problems rather than a tenacious fighter for change as now we have to admit he is. In fact, he appears a hard line, assertive pragmatic leader so able to talk to his citizens and to challenge the shadow powers contami-

nating the political systems, all over the world, without being an interventionist or a ready for military options leader. A position he continues to keep also in the worst conditions he might have wished to encounter in his first year.

In the paper “America and the world, Obama and the war”, published by Springer in Transition Studies Review at the beginning of 2009, before Obama formally assumed the Presidency at the White House, I wrote in the preface that *Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum*. Game over for the hypocrisy of those who see a kind of comforting joining line between the instrumental, populist, esoteric previous policy - which had enormous responsibilities in the financial and economic crisis that has seized the world - and the revival of great politics, credibility and constructive historical perspective of the US and the world. Multilateralism? No, better to call it multipartnership? Or interrelations, as the Chinese leaders described in Beijing?

Call it as you like, the horizon of international Relations driven mainly from the national point of view has already ended. Indeed, the finally global approach programme affirmed even at the fragile G20, the drastic change inherent in the planned agenda made by the excellent group of leading figures, special nominees and international experts that are governing the world now, on the one hand reveals the wrong way in which we embraced in the recent past; on the other, the path to recovery of a world role, albeit no longer hegemonic ruler as before. In fact, all five continents are involved, and the emerging countries as first, in a long term global policy of dialogue and cooperation. International vision, citizenship, common values, human rights, reducing inequalities, reforming and upgrading civil society are the priorities everywhere, without exceptions, if not in pathologic countries. A never-ending competition has started and the conclusion will reward the best performers. China, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, the main Islamic countries, after the European 28 and the neighbourhood club, have differently welcomed the new course: from enthusiastic comments of the great majority to explicit worries of a few on the dynamic determination to change and updating. The attractiveness of multilateralism and multi-partnership will help the world to abandon the isolation in the national already obsolete visions.

Global governance means common responsibilities but also interdependence, a bitter glass of medicine for those nostalgic of the past. Many expectations of change we were arguing about in very robust debate have been achieved but the long term will show if we are reaching the reformed governance at a “planetarian” scale or if we only create an expectation and a dangerous, deluded wish. No civil society will absolve this new leadership from the goals they chose anywhere in the world. Will the power, the institutional building, the public policy and the bureaucracy finally be affected? Oxana Gaman-Golutvina, Professor of Political Science at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations-MGIMO University and HSE-Higher School of Economics, wrote five years ago a very telling paper for the Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics on “The Changing Role of the State and State Bureaucracy in the Context of Public Administration Reforms: Russian and Foreign Experience”, where the structural reforms of the Russian system appeared in all their urgency (Gaman-Golutvina, 2008). Foreign Affairs, I have to quote again its last issue 2009, has dedicated a blaut but encouraging article by Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, which title is a forecast-wishful-prediction article: Russia Reborn. “Adopting a new role after 500 years as an empire, 70 years as an ideological warrior, and over 40 years during the Cold War as a military superpower will be difficult. Russia’s post-Soviet comeback disproved forecasts that Russia was going to descend into irrelevance. Russia - he wrote - will certainly survive the present economic crisis. But it does have a long way to go before it becomes a modern state capable of pursuing a foreign policy that serves its needs, not its nostalgia”.

Peace and war again remain the *alfa* and *omega*, Scylla and Charybdis for the future international order. Reading in the past the comments of the US Ambassador in Kabul, former General Karl Eikenberry, on the military buildup still requested by the military commanders on the field, the one who reportedly sent two classified memos to Washington cautioning Obama against sending more US and NATO troops to All American Presidents have declared themselves to be bearers of the olive branch and lovers of peace. But then they have often had to fight. Sometimes reporting positive international value added, as with the “victory strategy” in the Balkans, bringing the entire region in the EU enlargement process; other times having to face downturns and growing tensions. The outcome was in fact different also in Iraq, with the Bush Presidency, as we are looking in these days of civil war. But Johnson and partially also Kennedy in Vietnam came out as losers, of course in a completely different situation. And the outcome is negative in Afghanistan if the policy choices do not prevail over the “one-way” military options. The costs of the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have reached the 8-9 trillion of US\$ following a moderate accountancy, a debt for the next 10 years of US economy and society.

IRs theories of the past could help very marginally to inspire new architecture for security and stabilization in the region. This leads to the classic problem of “war and peace among nations”, as I above called the International Relations paradigm. To avoid conflict, everything is implemented, but then historical, political, international conditions might make it necessary. Unless a value, a mission is found that enthralls humanity and takes on a kind of “Homeric” mythical status. Homer’s work, in fact, comes to mind. As an Italian writer, Alessandro Baricco wrote a few years ago: “To be clear, I would like to say that the Iliad is a story of war, with no prudence or half measures. It was composed to sing of a war-like humanity, and to do in such a memorable manner as to last in eternity, continuing to sing the solemn beauties and the inevitable emotion that had been a time of war, and will always be so. At school it is perhaps told differently. But the crux of the matter is this. The Iliad is a monument to war. One of the surprising things about the Iliad is the power, I would say the compassion, with which the reasons of the vanquished are transmitted. It is a story written by the winners, and yet the human figures of the Trojans, remain in one’s memory. Priamus, Hector, Andromachus, even the lesser characters such as Pandarus or Sarpeden. This supernatural ability to be the voice of the whole of humanity, the memory of an obstinate love of peace (Baricco, 2004)”. It’s a good reading for the young generation of international relations students and researchers.

To conclude on this issue, a discontinuity that may give the US – although ready, with the allies, to defend supreme interests even with the use of force – the chance to really return to internationally agreed actions and solutions. It is also the way to consolidate the leadership of the *primus inter pares* with allies as well as with all the other major players in the global arena contributing to an enhancement of the International Relations theories. Let me close also with an attractive Baricco picture again: “As for atrocious sounds, it is necessary to recall that war is hell: but lovely. Men have forever thrown themselves into it like moths attracted by the mortal light of fire. There is no fear or horror of self that has been able to keep them away from the flame, because it is here that they have always found the only possible redemption from the shadows of life. Therefore, today, the task of real pacifism should not be to demonise the excess of war, but rather to understand that only when we are capable of another beauty will we be able to do without what war has always offered us”.

A very last point left. When lecturing abroad, out of Europe, many students asked me about the differences and peculiarities in Europe and in China. Being me from Venice, a capital of the former Republic of Venice, for 6-7 century the main power in the Mediterranean and in Near East, I tried to explain that the differences are not such great and we Europeans are living of

so many differences in languages, religions, cultures and traditions but belonging to the same Europe-Asia history. Of course the reference to Marco Polo and the Silk Road might be appearing a bit too cheap. And the students are not really convinced. I then took out a slide showing the Mongol Empire's maximal extension. I showed also to you, as Europe and Asia have crossed and shared for millennium the same fate, the same trade and the same main events as the Republic of Venice had demonstrated and as the Ottoman Empire as well showed so largely in Central Asia. But also China was so present in a large part of Europe, up to the Adriatic Sea, and in Hungary and down to the Balkans. Not to talk of the Habsburg Empire, with Charles V governing a kingdom where the sun where never at the sunset, referring to the short and also tragic Mexico inclusion on the Empire.

Why then are we so far from a proper reading also of International Relations? The gap is the lack of love for history or the forgiveness of history. I guess the second.

The title of my paper should have had a very intriguing question mark, as rarely we are accustomed to accepting in a paper. Is EurAsia one only continent? Too provocative but deeply true. Zeus in the mythology stories solved the daily quarrelling between two daughters asking him who was the most beautiful said for a long time that one was as pretty and nice as the other. But at the end he decided to call them Europe and Asia. In this case, remembering the deleted question mark was in some way appropriate because "work is in progress" around the world and no-one accepts a crystal ball. It is not a competition for hegemony, the real crucial topic of the contest among faculty and experts of International Relations in few, really influential endowed countries in this discipline. We are all trying to lay out global provisional governance, an interim and credible conceptual profile for more consolidated, robust international order architecture in the long term. Finally we are moving forward, after long immobile and standing negative situations.

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