

Turkey's Journey to Consolidate Liberal Democracy

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Abstract This research looks at Turkey's journey for democratization in its historical context for the last two hundred years with the objective to assess whether the process is strictly path-dependent. The study for this paper is based on empirical evidence found in academic literature, documents readily available in the public domain, and public statements from primary sources of academic, civil, and diplomatic backgrounds. Considering a dilemma of whether it is possible to build liberal institutions in a repressive system or it would be better to build liberal institutions and a democratic electoral system simultaneously, this research finds that repressive regimes undermine liberal institutions and offer an unrealistic alternative to a gradual, inclusive evolution of democracy. What distinguished modern Turkey from autocratic regimes of the Middle East is not electoral majoritarianism that pre-conditioned a strict sequencing of public order and liberalization first, but the embodiment of democratic principles and citizenship rights into state-building from very early on. The rise of Islamism in Turkey and deviation from the goal of institutionalized liberal democracy to authoritarianism threatens to overturn the gradual evolution of democracy in the Turkish society.

Keywords Turkey - Islamism - Democracy - Liberalism - Sequencing - Path-Dependence

1. Introduction

Democracy is a form of modern political governance that 'maintains binding consultation of equal citizens and protects them from arbitrary action by governmental agents'¹. Emergence of modern consolidated democracy in the Western world was a long and painful journey. The process of democratic transition depended on a 'complex mix of historical facts particular to each country'² and it involved formation of efficacious state bureaucracy, effective legal system, economic, and political freedoms³. Often it is difficult to predict when a country

1 Charles Tilly, "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization", Tilly Stories, Identities, and Political Change (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 4.

2 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (NY: Norton, 2003), 71.

3 Prof. Anna Seleny, "International Politics: Democracy," The Residency, Lecture 6, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

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can embrace democracy, much more so to establish a particular set of preconditions that must be in place in order for democracy to flourish. Assertion of certain hard-edged prerequisites⁴ associated with a gradual, liberal path for subsequent democratization does not offer a real choice in most cases.

Turkey drew on a great deal of democratic experience from the Ottoman Empire, but progression did not come ‘easily, peacefully, or in some straightforward, stage-like progression’⁵. While it is true that democracy is not an international cure-all and there is no universal applicability of the shock-therapy approach, advocates of sequentialism overestimate the importance of a standard transitional template that renders support for authoritarianism and ‘indefinitely delays democratization until deep structural conditions are ripe’⁶. This research finds that repressive regimes undermine liberal institutions and offer an unrealistic alternative to a gradual, inclusive evolution of democracy. ‘Turkey has a flawed but functioning liberal democracy’⁷ the foundations of which were laid in the mid-nineteenth century. The transition from monarchy to democracy endured problems, failures, and turmoil all of which can be seen as an ‘integral part the long-term process involving cultural learning and institution building’⁸ that was initiated during the Tanzimat era. Even the effective state-building strongmen of the Kemalist government in Turkey, who allegedly described their ‘authoritarian single party regime as a civilizing force’⁹ and followed an unhurried approach to multiparty elections, pursued both democratization and constitutional liberalism in parallel, not in a black-or-white approach. Founders of the modern republic recognized that abolishment of the monarchy in favor of the sovereign authority of people was the superior political option.

Fareed Zakaria’s policy prescription of strict sequencing that would defer people’s aspirations to vote and participate in political life would have been deeply problematic for the state establishment and peaceful development of a functioning liberal democracy in subsequent years. In Turkey, political development was not strictly path-dependent. Instead, building state-capacity beyond the initial stage was pursued at the same time as democratization, because civil liberties and democratic experimentation ‘had points of mutual reinforcement’¹⁰. Democracy was an ‘essential element of a complex system with many parts, not all of them subject to elections’¹¹.

This paper is divided into five parts. Part one provides an introduction and thesis. Part two lays out the background on democratization in Turkey and describes why iterative and cumulative way of democracy promotion, rather than democratic sequencing, offers a more realistic account of developments for successful transition. Part three looks at the rise of Islamism and deviation from the goal of institutionalized liberal democracy to authoritarianism in the context of the current government’s policies. Part four considers a more general dilemma of whether it is

4 Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons From Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1, 37.

5 *Ibid.*, 13.

6 Thomas Carothers, “How Democracies Emerge: Sequencing Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1, 14-15.

7 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (NY: Norton, 2003), 127.

8 Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons From Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1, 39.

9 Taylan Yildiz, *Democratic Sequentialism and Path Dependency Lessons from Turkey*, 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008, p. 3 (accessed November 3, 2014); available from: http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/cms/Dateien/yildiz_ISA2008paper_080405.pdf

10 Thomas Carothers, “How Democracies Emerge: Sequencing Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1: 20.

11 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (NY: Norton, 2003), 26.

possible to build liberal institutions in a repressive system or it would be better to build liberal institutions and a democratic electoral system simultaneously¹². Part five summarizes findings and draws conclusions.

2. Development of Democracy in Turkey

The roots for democratization efforts and political reform in modern Turkey are in constitutionalist movements during the final century of the Ottoman Empire. Reformers of the period from 1839 to 1876, also known as Tanzimat, were Ottoman statesmen who aimed to establish the rule-of-law, legal equality of all citizens, property rights, fair judiciary, anti-corruption measures, freedom of religion, and abolition of tax law among other administrative improvements¹³. The declining empire sought, in a defensive reaction against ambitious Western powers¹⁴, to substitute European-influenced nationalist movements with a new notion of Ottoman citizenry and began to deviate from an absolutist monarchy to the sovereignty of people through enactment of citizenship rights for all subjects.

Although Tanzimat laid essential foundation stones of a liberal society, some of the civil rights such as religious freedom had already been in place since the early days the empire. Yet, due to the spread of revolutionary ideas after 1789, the powerful central authority could not satisfy rising demands for autonomy, political rights, freedom of speech, and press from the public. The sultan could not ignore transformative forces of his politically savvy population. As the state bureaucracy grew stronger, reforms had ‘more far-reaching effects than originally intended culminating in the proclamation of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876’¹⁵. The first general assembly convened with ‘69 Muslim and 46 non-Muslim’¹⁶ members of the parliament elected from all levels of the society. Constitutional monarchy expanded civil liberties and carried out important educational, cultural, and economic reforms such as the ‘independent participation of women, for the first time, in work and academic life’¹⁷.

Initially, the vision of Young Turks of Tanzimat era was not participatory democracy, but a tradition of consultation grounded in Islamic tradition¹⁸. Though, limits on the sultan’s authority and separation of powers found strong support from patriotic circles who aspired to demonstrate that the ‘empire was capable of resolving its problems’¹⁹ without external influence, confirming Sheri Berman’s view that ‘all sorts of countries can undergo successful democratic development’²⁰. Two years after the opening, Sultan Abdulhamid II dissolved the parliament in 1878²¹ under the excuse of the emergency conditions during the Turko-Russian War. He repossessed his autocratic power to rule the country until a military coup led by Young Turks in

12 Prof. Anna Seleny, “International Politics: Final Assignment,” GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

13 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Westview Press: Colorado, 1994), 79-84.

14 William Hale, *Turkey’s Democratization Process* (NY: Routledge, 2014), 69.

15 *Ibid.*, 68.

16 Tarihi Keşfet, “Türkiye’de ilk Seçimler ne zaman yapıldı?,” (accessed November 5, 2014); available from: <http://www.tarihikesfet.com/2014/03/turkiyede-ilk-secim-ne-zaman-yapld.html>

17 Doç. Dr. Hakan Erdem, *Tarih 360 “Tanzimat”* (360 TV: Istanbul, 2014), 20:10; available from: <http://www.tv360.com.tr/programdetay.asp?id=321>

18 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 82.

19 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 82.

20 Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons From Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1: 30.

21 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Lawrence Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2010), 190.

1908 re-proclaimed the constitution²², and once again ‘every religious and ethnic group in the empire rejoiced’²³ on the tide of democracy.

Despite political instability, wars, revolutions, and counter-revolutions, the legacies of the period between 1839-1908 were powerful and long-lived. This was not a gradual, linear change with liberalism emerging before transition to democracy²⁴. The empire’s democratic experiment was turbulent, violent, and messy. It was the ‘first stage of a long and arduous process’, and like many countries’ early experiments with democracy, it was not smooth²⁵. Modern Turkey’s institutions derived their legacy from rooted national, political establishments of this era. The Grand National Assembly’s first delegates in 1920 included those members of the dissolved Ottoman parliament in 1918²⁶.

After the independence war in 1919-1922, Atatürk became the founder and the first president of the modern Republic of Turkey. He inaugurated Westernizing institutional reforms to expand civil liberties and prepared the country for consolidated democracy in the future. Still, he was an elected leader, and despite his strict secularization and nationalization program, he derived his enormous power from the parliament. The rapid pace of reforms were seen as necessary to cultivate a strong, enlightened middle-class who would keep the country on its course towards liberal democracy.

Kemalism was Atatürk’s doctrine to shape the new republic with his Westernizing vision. This era of regulated democracy is often branded as a ‘discourse of sequentialism’ and Atatürk as one of the preconditionists²⁷. Although the progressive development path was constrained by the Kemalist doctrine, Atatürk’s comprehensive reform program did not preclude free debate in the parliament and even, for a short period, the setup of two opposition parties. Unlike many democracy promoters in the Middle East, his strategy was to take ‘small but significant steps that create space and mechanisms for true political competition’²⁸. He built governmental capacity and strengthened central authority’s coercive power, which he perceived as the right strategy to maintain the order. There is an uninterrupted chain that links Kemalists to the Tanzimat era and the classical Ottoman Empire²⁹, but Atatürk forcefully tried to reduce Islam’s influence on politics, forge a uniform Turkish national identity, and replace Ottoman traditions with Western ways of behavior, administration, and justice³⁰. He undertook an uneasy task to construct a stable liberal democracy that ‘generally requires breaking down the institutions, relationships, and culture of the *ancien régime*’³¹. Transformational objectives and rapid pace of his ambitious state-building

22 Ibid., 189-190.

23 Ibid., 190.

24 Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons From Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1, 31.

25 Ibid., 39.

26 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 165-166.

27 Taylan Yildiz, *Democratic Sequentialism and Path Dependency Lessons from Turkey*, 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008, p. 10 (accessed November 3, 2014); available from: http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/cms/Dateien/yildiz_ISA2008paper_080405.pdf

28 Thomas Carothers, “How Democracies Emerge: Sequencing Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy* January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1: 26.

29 Huri Türsan, *Democratisation in Turkey* (Belgium: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A, 2004), 21.

30 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Lawrence Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2010), 221-226.

31 Sheri Berman, “The Vein Hope for Correct Timing,” *Journal of Democracy*, July 2007, Volume 18, Number 3, 16; available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf

program excluded formal recognition of ‘alternative sources of identity and loyalty’³² that would otherwise undermine unity of the nation-state and impede successful modernization. Still, women enjoyed electoral rights as early as 1934³³, even before their contemporaries in France, ‘the birthplace of modern European democracy’³⁴. The democratic institutions established during Atatürk’s government have endured and Turkey peacefully transitioned to multiparty system in 1946³⁵. The era of stability between 1923-1946 and ‘Turkish people’s commitment to political pluralism and political freedom’³⁶ enabled the country to survive the turmoil and social change of the years between 1950 and 2002. Despite three military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and a “post-modern coup” in 1997, achievements of democratically elected governments in overall have been impressive and enduring.

3. Liberal Democracy’s Challenge: The Rise of Islamism in Turkey

Atatürk’s relentless secularizing program did not resonate well in all parts of the society. The decades that followed the Kemalist revolution ‘brought religious reaction and provincial alienation’³⁷. Monopolization of power by a single party, state-led industrial reforms, and concentration of economic capital in a selected group of Westernized elites increasingly disturbed conservative professionals and businesspeople of the Anatolian heartland. People who felt alienated found in Islamism, a set of ideologies through which Islam is perceived as guiding social and political as well as personal life³⁸, a method to express their grievances. The secular government of the CHP³⁹ could not resist religious revival and demands for pluralism by the late 1940s. The victory of the DP⁴⁰ in 1950 elections and the rise of civilian conservatives ‘marked a break with the late Ottoman and early Republican trend, by which a career in military or the bureaucracy served as path to political power’⁴¹.

The process of further democratisation was interrupted or “re-balanced” four times in the next fifty years by the military elite who refused to submit to a popular mandate that would overturn Atatürk’s secular legacy. Their strict adherence to a historicist, reductionist interpretation of the Kemalist doctrine caused self-described moderns of the Turkish elite to eschew from pragmatism, decentralization, and pluralism as politico-cultural resources, the aggregate effect of which was ‘Islam’s reverberation effect’⁴². From 1980s onwards, policymakers of first the

32 aylan Yildiz, Democratic Sequentialism and Path Dependency Lessons from Turkey, 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008, p. 10 (accessed November 3, 2014); available from: http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/cms/Dateien/yildiz_ISA2008paper_080405.pdf

33 Interparliamentary Union: Women’s Suffrage (accessed November 7, 2014); available from: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm>

34 Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons From Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, January 2007, Volume 18, Number 1, 39.

35 Insight Turkey: The Politics of Turkish Democracy (accessed November 7, 2014); available from: <http://www.insightturkey.com/the-politics-of-turkish-democracy-ismet-inonu-and-the-/299>

36 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 268.

37 Anna Seleny, “Tradition, Modernity, and Democracy: The Many Promises of Islam,” *Perspectives on Politics*, September 2006 | Vol. 4/No.3, 485.

38 Prof. Anna Seleny, “International Politics: Middle East, Islam, and Democracy,” Lecture 10, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

39 CHP: Republican People’s Party.

40 DP: Democratic Party.

41 William L. Cleveland, *History of the Modern Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 262.

42 Anna Seleny, “Tradition, Modernity, and Democracy: The Many Promises of Islam,” *Perspectives on*

RP⁴³ and then the AKP⁴⁴ used religion as a source of public legitimacy to win electoral contests. Corruption and severe economic dislocation until 2001 also contributed to radicalization and extremism⁴⁵ of certain marginal groups under the AKP's umbrella.

The Kemalist state did not oppose religion nor did it aim to replace Islam with a state religion as in Stalin's Soviet Union, but it regulated practice of Sunni Islam through secularizing social and political life. Knowing that Iranian-style revolutionary Islamism would not take hold in Turkey, the once-fundamentalist movements of RP and AKP cleverly joined pluralism of moderate, political Islam with pragmatism of embracing democracy, modernity, and liberal global economy⁴⁶ in order to lure an increasingly vibrant, affluent, and young electorate. The landslide victory of the AKP in every election since 2002 empowered moderate Islamists to reshape the political and economic mainstream. While extreme nationalist and secularist views found weak support⁴⁷, the AKP has been able to capture the strategic middle through 'successful integration of Muslim values and non-religious concerns'⁴⁸. Anwar Ibrahim explains this phenomenon as the nation's aspiration to refresh its collective memory of cultural heritage and 'to mature further as a democracy while retaining its Muslim identity'⁴⁹.

The state's 'decreasing importance as leading agent of the socioeconomic development'⁵⁰ since 1980s fueled an ambitious economic liberalization program. While this is crucially important in and of itself, it is not a precondition for democratic consolidation since economic development is often the outcome rather than the cause⁵¹. Expansion of civil liberties, political rights, and press freedom has positive spillover effects that bring economic prosperity and eventual wealth⁵². The AKP's golden age of 2002-2007, in this regard, was underpinned by steps to instigate substantial democratic and liberal reforms in economic progress, judiciary, civil-military relations, and minority rights, thus raising its popularity in parallel with hopes about Turkey's membership prospects to the EU. Despite economic and regulatory reforms, redistribution of wealth, plus the rise of new business elites to challenge the dominance of established, secular, big businesses, however, Turkey's growth over the past decade has depended on unsustainable levels of domestic consumption and trade deficits⁵³, partly due to the AKP's populism and pressure on the Central Bank for monetary expansion. The government remained 'insulated from feedback about how

Politics, September 2006 | Vol. 4/No.3, 488.

43 RP: The Islamist Welfare Party

44 AKP: Justice and Development party

45 Prof. Anna Seleny, "International Politics: Middle East, Islam, and Democracy," Lecture 10, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

46 Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 7, 2007, p. 1272. Accessed November 8, 2014. Available from JSTOR: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454998>.

47 Ibid.

48 Anna Seleny, "Tradition, Modernity, and Democracy: The Many Promises of Islam," *Perspectives on Politics*, September 2006 | Vol. 4/No.3, 488.

49 Anwar Ibrahim, "Universal Values And Muslim Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 17, Number 3 July 2006, 8.

50 Prof. Anna Seleny, "International Politics: Middle East, Islam, and Democracy," Lecture 10, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

51 Ibid.

52 Richard Roll and John R. Talbott, "Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity," *Journal of Democracy*, July 2003, Volume 14, Number 3, 85.

53 Daron Acemoğlu, "The Failed Autocrat," *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, May 22, 2014 (accessed October 28, 2014); available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141444/daron-acemoglu/the-failed-autocrat>.

its policies are affecting the economy⁵⁴, until violent popular protests and corruption scandals in 2013 laid bare the fragile foundation upon which the image of Turkey as a regional and global power had been presented to the world by the AKP⁵⁵.

The AKP's political entrepreneur and the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, exploited favorable conditions and banked on electoral capabilities⁵⁶ of the political society to subvert liberal institutions, such as the rule-of-law, separation of powers, and freedom of the press in order to propel the economy and create a pious, loyal middle-class. He used the state security apparatus to control every aspect of his subjects' lives and perceived Turkey's democratization program as a train to get to get-off when he reached his target. Instead of shrinking its influence, the state 'became a prime diverter itself, expropriating property and repudiating contracts'⁵⁷. The net result of AKP's counter-revolution against Kemalism has therefore been a flawed liberal democracy at best. This may even lean towards an authoritarian system with a capitalist market as AKP won the elections in November 2015 and regained power to bring is one step closer to amend the constitution and grant dictatorial powers to Erdoğan.

The AKP government triumphed in elections by making full use of the democratic process the more extreme Erdoğan's rhetoric, the more popular he got⁵⁸. Nevertheless, this should not lead to a presumption that democratization results in illiberal leadership or that Turkey is unprepared for democratic transition. However weak and problematic the outcome might be, it is not despite democratic elections, but because of it that Turkey maintains a strong prospect to prevent an outright illiberal autocracy, if it ever appears on the horizon. Liberal institutions help to 'temper public passion, educate citizens, and guide democracy'⁵⁹, but what Zakaria prescribes by giving Jordan as an example that 'an unelected monarch is more liberal, more open, and more progressive than elected democrats' would not be true for Turkey if open process of political competition and choice were absent. Just as a simple universalist perspective of democracy promotion would be detrimental to liberal rule-of-law, indefinite deferral of political empowerment would create deep fault lines on ethnic and religious grounds in the society and threaten whatever rule-of-law has been achieved in the mean time⁶⁰, not enhance it.

4. Liberal Institutions: Autocracy versus Democracy

Beyond the initial stage of having a functioning state-bureaucracy, economic development should go hand-in-hand with political freedom and civil liberty. Civil society requires law to protect it, without which the state monopolizes public sphere and persecutes its critics and rivals, like Ai WeiWei in China⁶¹. To maintain its legitimacy, an effective state should observe constraint in its coercive power. If the necessary checks and balances on the ruler are weak, country may drift towards dictatorship, which tends 'overtime to become arrogant and corrupt', as is the case with

54 Richard Roll and John R. Talbott, "Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity," *Journal of Democracy*, July 2003, Volume 14, Number 3, 79.

55 The International New York Times, "Mine disaster evolves into a political crisis," Tim Arango, Kareem Fahim, Sebnem Arsu, (Soma, Turkey: May 17-18, 2014).

56 Prof. Anna Seleny, "International Politics: Middle East, Islam, and Democracy," Lecture 10, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

57 Richard Roll and John R. Talbott, "Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity," *Journal of Democracy*, July 2003, Volume 14, Number 3, 79

58 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (NY: Norton, 2003), 61.

59 *Ibid.*, 26

60 Francis Fukuyama, "Liberalism Versus State-Building," *Journal of Democracy*, July 2007, Volume 18, Number 3, 12-13; available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf

61 International Politics, Ai WeiWei: Never Sorry, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

Erdoğan in Turkey⁶². Authoritarian governance structures, as in Russia and China, are less likely to ‘keep governing a country that is increasingly open, messy, and diverse’⁶³.

Liberal institutions make democracy endure and democracy re-enforces liberal institutions. While democratic sequencing is not inconsequential, ‘dictators are not the most likely implementers of well-sequenced reforms leading to democracy’⁶⁴. Government should be responsive to people’s demands, respect each individual as a choice-maker, and treat them equally before law. If only people do not live in fear of their rulers can a healthy and growing economy be sustainable. Short of windfall revenues, like the discovery of oil in the UAE, democratic conditions cause economic prosperity, and not the other way around⁶⁵. Stable democracies are formed after long years of struggle and it is better to try and experiment with democracy than not to try at all until an indefinite future. In Iraq and Egypt, the failure of first democratic governments should not prevent further efforts for institution building. The problem in Iraq, for instance, was not so much that the US tried to impose democracy overnight, but instead Maliki and his supporters relied on the Shiite majority population to hijack the democracy-building experiment, and advocated a strong, centralized national government, defying their promises to keep a power-sharing arrangement⁶⁶. Ned Parker concludes that ‘Maliki’s harassment and persecution dramatically reduced freedom throughout Iraq’⁶⁷.

5. Conclusion

Democratic consolidation in a cosmopolitan society as Turkey’s is a formidable and long journey. There is no single, right path to democracy, and while facilitative factors such as historical experience may enable a smoother transition, practically many countries undergo problems, false starts, and reversals in their struggle for democracy⁶⁸. Liberal institutions can function most effectively in a democratic society and economic prosperity is positively correlated with political freedoms. Economic development should be subordinated to pursuit for liberal democracy.

Turkey’s flawed but functioning democracy has endured revolutions, illiberal movements, and military interventions. The country has successfully risen from the ashes of an empire and instituted reforms that brought a modern nation into life. Despite external influences, from great-power games in the Ottoman era to the prospect for EU membership in the republican era, most of the impetus for liberalization has come from within. What distinguished modern Turkey from autocratic regimes of the Middle East is not electoral majoritarianism that pre-conditioned a strict sequencing of public order and liberalization first, but the embodiment of democratic principles and citizenship rights into state-building from very early on. It is regulated, representative democracy after all that secures civil liberties, lives, and livelihoods.

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62 Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (NY: Norton, 2003), 269.

63 Ibid.

64 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “The Sequencing ‘Fallacy,’” *Journal of Democracy*, July 2007, Volume 18, Number 3, 8; available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf

65 Prof. Anna Seleny, “International Politics: Middle East, Islam, and Democracy,” Lecture 10, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2014.

66 Ned Parker, “Welcome to the World’s Next Failed State,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012, 94-110.

67 Ibid., 95.

68 Sheri Berman, “The Vein Hope for Correct Timing,” *Journal of Democracy*, July 2007, Volume 18, Number 3, 15-16; available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf

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